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Abstract
Small-scale farms – defined as being less than 2 ha – are predominant in the agricultural
sector, especially in developing countries. However, they face major disadvantages caused
by high unit transaction costs and weak market power. Collective action through the
establishment of farmer-owned organizations, or cooperatives, is a promising solution
to the problems of smallholder farmers. Those farmer organizations are increasingly
popular in developing countries with collective marketing (i.e., marketing cooperatives)
and group certification being the two highly common functions.
This dissertation investigates collective action among small-scale farmers through case
studies of tea production in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. Vietnam is one of the world largest
tea producers, and smallholder farmers own up to 70 percent of the national tea planta-
tion area. As with other crops, recent transitions in the food sector – e.g., expansion of
supermarkets and increasing concerns about food standards – exacerbate disadvantages
of small-scale tea farmers in Vietnam. Collective action, such as collective marketing and
group certification, has been promoted to link small-scale farmers to the changing food
markets. Thai Nguyen - a province in the northern mountainous region of Vietnam - is
a center of green tea production which has highly active development of farmer-owned
marketing cooperatives and certification groups. Thus, the province offers a compelling
context for studying farmers’ collective action.
By focusing common collective activities – collective marketing and group certification
– among smallholder green tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, this dissertation contributes to
the literature on a central research question: How do small-scale farmers benefit from
collective action? Current literature could be divided into two strands. On one hand, the
first strand of literature quantitatively evaluates the impacts of marketing cooperatives
and certification groups, in which impacts on farm income are a common interest. On
the other hand, the second strand explores the determinants of smallholder farmers’
participation in the collective action. This dissertation identifies three research gaps in
the two literature strands and present results from three case studies on small-scale green
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tea farmers in Thai Nguyen to contribute to the knowledge of collective action among
small farmers.
The first two case studies evaluate the impacts collective marketing and group certifi-
cation on income of small-scale farmers – belonging the first main strand of literature.
To conduct the impact evaluation, original data on smallholder farmers in 4 central tea
producing regions (located in 7 communes) of Thai Nguyen were collected through a
household survey in Jul - August 2017. The survey followed mixed sampling strategies:
all members of marketing cooperatives and certification groups were included if possible;
non-members in were sampled randomly. After data cleaning, the sample consists of 476
tea small family farms (households). Of these, 60 were certified cooperative members,
87 were certified farmers but not members of any cooperative, 75 were non-certified co-
operative members and 254 were not members of either cooperatives or certified groups
(control households).
The first case study investigates the impacts of collective marketing via farmer coopera-
tives on income of smallholder tea farmers. Although tea is a highly important product
for small farmers in many developing countries, little is known about the impacts of col-
lective marketing on tea farmers (Research gap 1). This case study therefore contributes
to knowledge on collective marketing by analyzing a sub-sample of 329 farmers from
the original data on 476 smallholder tea farmers in Thai Nguyen. The treated group
was the 75 non-certified cooperative members, while the comparison group was the 254
control households. Propensity score matching (PSM) was employed to mitigate bias
caused by the self-selection of the cooperative membership. However, across different
PSM models, this case study could not find conclusive impacts of cooperative member-
ship on the income from tea farming. A plausible and important reason is that collective
marketing was inactive for many cooperative members. Another interpretation of the
finding is a high divergence in other components of cooperative membership, such as
past certification and technical assistance.
By contrast, the second case study shows significant impacts of group certification on
income of smallholder tea farmers in Thai Nguyen. Thai Nguyen green tea products
are principally consumed in the domestic markets – a compelling context examined by
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very few studies on certification standards (Research gap 2). Thus, the case study makes
an important contribution to the literature on the impacts of certification programs
for groups of smallholder farmers. From the same data 476 small tea farmers in Thai
Nguyen, this study selected a different sub-sample of 401 farmers: 147 certified farmers
(87 certified non-cooperative members and 60 certified cooperative members) and 254
control farmers. A similar PSM procedure as in the first study was applied. Results
show that adoption of group certification significantly increased sales, selling price and
net income. Labor costs were also higher for certified tea farmers. The findings of this
case study lend evidence-based support to the implementation of voluntary certification
standards for specialty green tea production.
The third and last case study contributes to the second strand of literature on factors
influencing farmer participation in collective action. This study applies randomized con-
joint analysis (RCA) which allow estimating causal effects of design attributes – i.e.,
certification fee, price premium, record keeping, requirements about the application of
fertilizer and pesticides – on farmer participation in hypothetical group certification
programs (VietGAP). Despite their importance of design attributes, very few studies ex-
amine how those attributes affect farmer participation in certification schemes (Research
gap 3). This case study used different sample data on 750 small-scale tea farmers in Dai
Tu district. This district is the largest tea producing area in Thai Nguyen, and local
tea farmers have high exposure to certification programs, giving favorable conditions
for conducting the RCA. Data was collected in June - Jul 2018 with relatively similar
mixed sampling strategies as in the two previous case studies. Results indicate that the
requirement of combined application of organic and chemical fertilizer, a recommended
practice for maintaining soil health, did not reduce the participation significantly. In
addition, when this requirement is packaged with delayed payment for organic fertilizer
purchase, the participation rate can be enhanced. Importantly, despite the availability
of price premiums, the certification fee is a major barrier preventing tea farmers from
produced certified food products.
Based on the findings of the three case studies, the dissertation discusses further impli-
cations for the central research question as well as for policies related to collective action
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among small-scale farmers. First, the economic benefits of collective action through
farmer organizations appear ambivalent. When we investigate the effects of membership
which does not fully reflect the active participation and which contains diverged inter-
vention components, results could be inconclusive. However, when we examine farmer
organizations with high similarity in their function and member activity, clear benefits
are more plausible. Second, although economic benefits of collective action could be tan-
gible, low member contribution is a major issue for the realization of such benefits. Thus,
one critical challenge for development agencies as well as leaders of farmer organizations
lies in encouraging small-scale farmers to pool their resources together.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Disadvantages of small-scale farmers
Small-scale farms – defined as being less than 2 ha – are predominant in the agricultural
sector, especially in developing countries 1. Of 570 million farms worldwide, 475 million
farms (84 percent) are smaller than 2 ha, and those small farms account for 12 percent of
the world agricultural farmland. In low and lower-middle income countries, at least 70
percent of farms are small-scale, and smallholder farmers use 30-40 percent of farmlands
(Lowder et al., 2016). Small-scale farming therefore provides a livelihood for hundreds
of millions of households in developing countries.
However, small-scale farmers face major disadvantages caused by transaction costs.
Transaction costs – costs of making economic trades (Williamson, 1985) - include both
fixed cost such as partner seeking, negotiation and monitoring and variable costs such as
transportation (Key et al., 2000). Small-scale farmers usually have low transaction costs
of accessing and monitoring highly motivated family labors; however, their unit costs
of non-labor transactions are high (Poulton et al., 2010). For instance, all else being
equal, compared to large-scale producers, small farmers have much higher unit costs of
accessing input and output markets, obtaining technical knowledge and transferring of
the goods. The problems of transaction costs are exacerbated by poverty, low education
and underdeveloped transportation and information systems, which are common among
small-scale farmers (Poulton et al., 2010).
1 In the literature on agricultural farms, the two terms: small-scale farms (or smallholder farms)
and family farms are often used interchangeably since most of family farms are small-scale (FAO, 2014;
Lowder et al., 2016). In this dissertation, small-scale farms also mean family farms.
1
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In addition to transaction cost, a large number of small-scale farms and, usually, a much
fewer number of buyers or input suppliers lead to a relatively weak market power to the
former. Consequently, small-scale farmers are prone to “opportunistic behaviors” in their
trade with buyers or input suppliers (Fischer and Qaim, 2012).
For small-scale farmers in developing countries, the disadvantages are even more critical
due to the recent transformation of food markets. Global concerns about food safety,
environmental sustainability and social issues (e.g., labor conditions, gender equality
and producer welfare) in agricultural production are growing (Narrod et al., 2009; Foley
et al., 2011; Potts et al., 2014). Integration with global markets means that safety
and sustainability-related standards gradually become important attributes for food and
beverages. This trend typically poses severe challenges to numerous small-scale farmers
in developing countries due to weak regulatory institutions (Ibanez and Blackman, 2016;
Naziri et al., 2014).
Moreover, supermarkets expand rapidly in developing countries and compete directly
with traditional wet-markets (Reardon et al., 2009; Rischke et al., 2015). The emergence
of supermarkets modernizes procurement practices which prioritize food quality and
safety standards and contract-based linkages with producers (Reardon et al., 2009). High
transaction costs and weak market power largely prevent individual small-scale farmers
from certifying the quality of their products and getting engaged in supply chains for
modern markets. Thus, the growth of food markets can put a high risk of market
exclusion on small-scale farmers in developing countries (Markelova et al., 2009).
1.1.2 Collective action among small-scale farmers
Collective action – through the voluntary establishment of farmer groups, organiza-
tions, or cooperatives – is seen as a key solution to the problems of smallholder farmers
(Markelova et al., 2009). In reality, smallholder farmers often spontaneously gather in
informal groups, for example, to exchange labors. However, collective action, hereafter,
refers to formal farmer organizations which have legal registration of their establishment,
purposes, administrative structure and members. Those farmer organizations are also
different from the state-owned organizations (e.g., state-owned agricultural cooperatives),
as the former are owned and controlled by the farmers themselves.
Previous studies have explained the potential benefits of collective action through farmer
organizations. By acting collectively, smallholder farmers can reduce unit transaction
costs by achieving better economy of scale and overcome common market failures in
developing countries such as information asymmetries and imperfect property right.
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(Markelova et al., 2009; Ouma et al., 2010; Shiferaw et al., 2011). Rural farmer organiza-
tions can also facilitate farmers’ access to support from government and non-government
organizations regarding capacity building, information exchange and innovation (Fischer
and Qaim, 2012; Rao and Qaim, 2011).
Farmer organizations can offer various services related to all stages of agricultural produc-
tion, ranging from input purchase, agricultural extension, financial services, processing
to selling Fischer and Qaim (2012). This dissertation focuses on two highly common
functions of farmer organizations: collective marketing and group certification.
Firstly, collectively selling products via farmer-owned agricultural cooperatives is an
important marketing strategy for farmers not only in developing but also in developed
countries. For instance, marketing cooperatives make up about 54% of agricultural
cooperative in the U.S in 2017 (USDA, 2017). In European countries such as Finland,
Italy and the Netherlands, more than half of the agricultural products are sold via
farmer cooperatives (Tchami, 2007). Recently, there is a renewed interest in marketing
cooperatives in developing countries. Many studies show that, after the dissolution of
state-owned or colonial cooperatives, marketing cooperatives are increasingly established
by smallholder farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer and
Qaim, 2012; Olwande et al., 2015) and Asia (e.g., Roy and Thorat, 2008; Scholl et al.,
2016; Hao et al., 2018).
Members of marketing cooperatives bulk their farm output together and sell collectively,
which reduces the unit transaction costs and eases access to new markets (Markelova
et al., 2009). Marketing cooperatives can also improve bargaining power, and reduce
price uncertainty for farmers (Cakir and Balagtas, 2012; Agbo et al., 2015). Therefore,
collective marketing is widely considered as a promising path to integrate smallholder
farmers into markets and to improve their welfare.
Secondly, group certification schemes for smallholder farmers in developing countries
has gained considerable momentum. As mentioned above, although food certification
standards have become increasingly important for penetrating modern agricultural mar-
kets, smallholder farmers have great difficulties in acquiring those standards individually.
Thus, a large number of voluntary certification standards involving groups of smallholder
farmers in developing countries have been introduced. Those certification schemes typi-
cally declare their highest goals as achieving sustainable agriculture by addressing three
aspects i.e., economic, environmental and social (DeFries et al., 2017). As of 2016, there
are more than 200 sustainability standards (ITC, 2016). Several popular schemes are
Fairtrade, Organic and UTZ. In addition to periodic external monitoring from third par-
ties, these certification schemes rely on self-managed groups in which farmers voluntarily
participate to enforce compliance with standardized farming practices.
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From an economic perspective, one rationale for the benefits of the group certification is
that smallholder farmers receive a price premium for their collectively certified products.
That price premium derives from consumers having additional willingness to pay for
certification labels, which has been shown to be plausible in many studies (e.g., Marette
et al., 2012; Rousseau and Vranken, 2013). Further, improved access to input and out-
put markets and dissemination of technical information also contribute to the economic
impacts of certification programs.
In consideration of their practical and academic significance, this dissertation exclu-
sively examines marketing cooperatives and certification groups established by small-
holder farmers in developing countries.
1.1.3 Tea production
This dissertation investigates collective action among small-scale farmers through case
studies in tea production, primarily because tea is a highly important crop for small-scale
farmers in many developing countries.
From the demand side, in 2013, with a total consumption of around 4.8 million tonnes,
tea – Camellia sinensis – is the most consumed beverage (FAO, 2015a). From the supply
side, world tea production increases steadily and reaches approximately 5 million tonnes
in 2013. Strikingly, as much as 98% of total tea production comes from developing
countries (FAO, 2015a). Big producers are mainly found in Asia, e.g., China, India,
Sri Lanka, Turkey Indonesia, and Vietnam, while one of few exceptions is Kenya in
Africa. Thus, tea production and trading form a significant industry in many developing
countries.
Moreover, small-scale farmers have become a major factor in the tea industry in many
developing countries. Most of the tea plantations were traditionally operated in large-
scale farms. However, in many leading tea producing countries, there has been a dramatic
growth in the small-scale tea farms. Tea cultivation is able to give a stable income
throughout the year, does not needs large investment and bears little serious risk. These
characteristics explain the large number of small-scale tea farms (Van Der Wal, 2008).
For example, more than 60% of tea in Kenya, 76% in Sri Lanka are grown by smallholder
farmers (FAO, 2015b). In Vietnam, small farmers own up to 70% of tea plantation areas
(Ha, 2014). As such, a vast number of rural families in developing countries rely on
small-scale tea farming as a crucial income source.
Tea also has additional characteristics that make it an interesting study context for
collective action among smallholder farmers. Compared to staples or fruits, tea products
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requires relatively more processing – such as drying and roasting. This processing gives
high added-value to tea products. Further, since tea drinking is rooted deeply, tea has
an important cultural value in many countries, especially in Asia. Multiple classes of tea
products are available, from ordinary tea for daily use to very premium tea for special
occasions like tea ceremonies or gifting. Tea therefore has the potential to become a high-
value product or to move beyond local markets, giving favorable conditions for collective
action among smallholder farmers.
Due to the aforementioned reasons, tea production offers an appealing context to study
farmers’ collective action. In this dissertation, I present case studies on small-scale green
tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. Elaboration on tea production and collective
activities in the study sites will be provided in chapter 2.
1.2 Academic gaps and research questions
Since collective action among small farmers – collective marketing through farmer co-
operatives and group certification – has gained popularity in developing countries, a
considerable body of literature has investigated the question: How do small-scale farm-
ers benefit from the collective action?
In order to answer the above-mentioned broad question from a quantitative perspective,
current literature could be divided into two strands 2. On one hand, the first strand
of literature quantitatively evaluates the impacts of collective action. Impacts of farmer
cooperatives and certification standards are assessed on various outcomes such as market
access (Olwande et al., 2015; Snider et al., 2017), technology adoption (Abebaw and
Haile, 2013; Chagwiza et al., 2016) and environmentally friendly practices (Chiputwa
et al., 2015; Giuliani et al., 2017). Nonetheless, since welfare improvement is typically
a key goal for farmer organizations, economic impacts on income of smallholder farmers
are of high-interest (Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Ma and Abdulai, 2016; Rijsbergen et al.,
2016). To understand the economic impact path of collective action, studies regularly
examine effects on components of farm income including sales, production, productivity
and costs.
On the other hand, the second strand explores the determinants of smallholder farmers’
participation in the collective action. These studies investigate factors which are related
to contextual settings, organizational structures as well as farmer characteristics affecting
2 There are also qualitative studies examining organizational aspects (J. Barham and Chitemi, 2009;
Narrod et al., 2009) or farmers’ attitude to collective action (Cechin et al., 2013). However, this dis-
sertation primarily focuses on quantitative evidence to answer the research question. Findings from
qualitative studies are mainly used to support arguments related to research gaps.
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the membership of farmer cooperatives or certification groups (Mojo et al., 2017; Latyn-
skiy and Berger, 2016; Handschuch et al., 2013; Kersting and Wollni, 2012). Findings
from this strand of literature are vital to understand when collective action can deliver
benefits to participants and what type of farmers are likely to receive the benefits.
This dissertation contributes to the growing literature on the central research question:
Central research question: “How do small-scale farmers benefit from collective
action?”
I identify three research gaps – corresponding to three component research questions
– in the studies on this central question, particularly on marketing cooperatives and
certification standards. This dissertation is structured to address these three research
gaps with case studies on smallholder green tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam.
The first two research gaps are related to the literature about impact evaluation of the
collective action - the first strand. To be specific, whether collective action can improve
farm income is largely unknown in many contexts. First, in regards of collective mar-
keting, economic impact evaluation has been found in the context of important crops
for small farmers in developing countries, such as rice, banana, apple or grape (Abdul-
Rahaman and Abdulai, 2018; Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Ma and Abdulai, 2016; Roy and
Thorat, 2008). However, although small-scale tea farming is crucial income sources for
millions of rural households in developing countries, I am not aware of any quantitative
studies estimating the effects of collective marketing on small tea farmers. As mentioned
in the previous section, tea has distinctive characteristics for a compelling case study.
For processed agricultural products and longer value chains – as it is the case for tea
products, collective marketing through cooperatives could have favorable conditions to
deliver economic benefits (Markelova and Mwangi, 2010). Hence, the dissertation eval-
uates the impacts of marketing cooperatives on small-scale tea farmers in Thai Nguyen,
Vietnam with the first research question as follows:
Research question 1: “Can collective marketing improve income of small-scale
tea farmers?”
The second research gap is about impact evaluation of the group certification. Almost
all studies to date only examine economic impacts of certification standards on crop
farmers with well-established links to export markets (e.g., Holzapfel and Wollni, 2014;
Rijsbergen et al., 2016; Subervie and Vagneron, 2013). Rising living standards and
rapid expansion of modern retails have led to the emergence of voluntary certification
standards, even in the domestic markets of developing countries (Berdegué et al., 2005;
Henson and Reardon, 2005; Mergenthaler et al., 2009b). While results for certified
export crops cannot be directly applied, there are very few studies examine impacts of
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certification on small-scale farmers in the context of domestic markets. The dissertation
thus addresses this research gap by evaluating economic impacts of group certification on
of small-scale tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam who are producing specialty green
tea principally for domestic markets. The second research question is stated as below:
Research question 2: “Can group certification improve income of small-scale
tea farmers?”
To answer research question 1 and 2, I used a sample of 476 smallholder tea farmers
collected in 2017 and employed propensity score matching (PSM) to mitigate the self-
selection bias.
Finally, the third research gap is in the second strand of literature which examines fac-
tors affecting farmer participation in collective action. For this research, I particularly
focus on farmer participation in group certification schemes. Other studies primarily
explore the farm and regional characteristics which are correlated with participation in
certification programs (e.g., Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Handschuch et al., 2013). Mean-
while, design attributes of certification schemes – certification fee, price premium, record
keeping, requirements about the application of fertilizer and pesticides – play a crucial
role in participation decision. The significance of design attributes has been examined
for institutional arrangements involving smallholder farmers, such as contract farming
(Abebe et al., 2013; Schipmann and Qaim, 2011), supermarket contracts (Ochieng et al.,
2017) and soil conservation (Marenya et al., 2014). Similar studies for certification are
scarce. To fill this knowledge gap, I conducted a randomized conjoint analysis (RCA) –
a choice experiment to study stated preference – on 750 small-scale tea farmers in Thai
Nguyen, Vietnam in 2018. The third research question is as below:
Research question 3: “Which design attributes of certification programs can
affect small-scale tea farmers’ participation?”
By answering the three above research questions with case studies on small-scale tea
farmers in Vietnam, this dissertation makes an original academic contribution to the
literature on the central research question. Moreover, based on the results from the case
studies, the dissertation also gives insightful implications for policies related to collective
action among small-scale farmers.
1.3 Dissertation structure
This dissertation consists of 6 chapters with the structure illustrated in Figure 1.1.
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(1) How effective is collective 
action among small-scale 
farmers?
(2) Which factors affect small-
scale farmers’ participation in 
collective action?
Chapter 3
Impacts of marketing 
cooperatives on income 
of small-scale farm 
income
Chapter 4
Impacts of voluntary 
certification on small-
scale farm income
Chapter 1: Introduction
How do small-scale farmers benefit from collective action?
Chapter 5
Farmers’ Preferences for 
Certification Schemes: A 
Randomized Conjoint 
Analysis
Chapter 2: Overviews of study sites and methods
Chapter 6: Conclusion
Figure 1.1: Dissertation structure
Chapter 1 has so far provided background information on collective action among small-
scale farmer and tea production. Importantly, it has explained the significance of the
central research question and 3 related research gaps in the two strands of current liter-
ature.
Chapter 2 justifies the selection of study sites in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. In doing so, I
describe intriguing features of tea production in Vietnam as well as in Thai Nguyen. The
chapter further elaborates on collective action among small-scale farmers in Vietnam and
tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, particularly in regards to marketing cooperatives and group
certification schemes. An overview of the two methods used this dissertation – PSM and
RCA – are also provided in this chapter.
Chapter 3, 4 and 5 are core contents of the dissertation, which present case studies to
address the three mentioned research questions. Specifically, chapter 3 and chapter 4
answers the first two research question related to impact evaluation of collective action.
Chapter 3 present economic impacts of marketing cooperatives on income from small-
scale tea farming. Meanwhile, chapter 4 evaluates the economic impact of certification
groups. Because both the two chapters use the same sample of small-scale farmers in
Thai Nguyen, Vietnam and the same PSM method for the impact evaluation, details on
data collection and PSM procedure are only described in chapter 3. Chapter 5 answers
the third research question with a randomized conjoint analysis which shed light on the
causal impacts of design attributes on farmers’ stated preference of certification programs.
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Chapter 6 concludes findings from the three core chapters. In addition, based on the
findings, this chapter also discusses implications for studies and policies related to collec-
tive action among smallholder farmers. Lastly, the chapter acknowledges the limitations
of the dissertation and give recommendations for future research.
Chapter 2
Overviews of study sites and
methods
2.1 Tea production and collective actions among small-scale
tea farmers in Vietnam
Tea production in Vietnam provides a compelling case study for collective actions among
small-scale farmers for two reasons. First, Vietnam is a top-rank tea producing country
where small-scale farmers are a crucial part of the national tea industry. Second, collec-
tive actions among small-scale farmers, due to the rapid transformation of food markets,
have been blooming in Vietnam. The following subsections further justify the selection
of study sites in Vietnam
2.1.1 Tea production in Vietnam
Vietnam is a top-rank tea producing country and also a cradle of tea consumption. In
2016, with a harvested area of 118,824 ha, Vietnam has a total dried tea production of
240,000 tonnes - ranked sixth worldwide (FAOSTAT, 2016). The largest tea producing
zone is located in the northern mountainous area due to suitable climate and topography
(Hong and Yabe, 2015). Main products are black tea and green tea with almost equal
proportion; there are also other minor products such as Oolong tea. Vietnam also exports
both black and green tea; however, most exports products are in large packaging without
labels and brands (Viet Khoi et al., 2015) 1. On the consumption side, tea drinking is an
1 Vietnam is ranked fifth in the volumes of tea exports in 2013 (90,296 tonnes) (FAOSTAT, 2016)
According to statistic from ITC in 2016, approximately 95% of exports tea are in immediate packaging
of more than 3 kg (ITC, 2016).
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embedded culture among Vietnamese consumers (Wenner, 2011). The presence of tea in
daily communication as well as formal ceremonies has been maintained for thousands of
years, which gives it a special cultural value. Preferred types of tea differ from the North
to the South; however, bitter green tea is the most popular (Wenner, 2011).
Regarding the tea value chain in Vietnam, highly fragmented and small-scale production,
processing and trading are prominent features. The first key actor in the chain is about
400,000 smallholder tea farmers who own approximately 70 percent of the total national
tea cultivation area (Ha, 2014). Fresh green tea is often home-processed into dried tea or
sold to other small household processors. The dried tea is mostly sold to local middlemen,
who then distribute the products to downstream wholesalers and retailers. (Viet Khoi
et al., 2015).
As with other crops, there are huge challenges induced by a transitional food sector for
small-scale tea farmers in Vietnam. The rapid expansion of supermarkets, derived from
fast economic growth and urbanization, gradually drags consumers from traditional wet
markets and small retail stores. (Wertheim-Heck and Spaargaren, 2016; Moustier et al.,
2010). In addition, integration with global markets as well as domestic consumers’ rising
concerns about food safety put greater emphasis on certification standards for foods
and beverages. (Mergenthaler et al., 2009b; Mergenthaler et al., 2009c; Nguyen, 2017).
Smallholder farmers can hardly compete with large-scale farms to get engaged in supply
chains for modern supermarkets and overseas markets. They also face prohibited costs to
individually adopt certification standards. Vietnamese small-scale farmers are therefore
at risk of exclusion from modern and high-value markets, which may push them down
to left-behind groups of economic development. Collective action has been promoted to
link small-scale farmers to changing food markets.
2.1.2 Collective action small-scale tea farmers in Vietnam
Collective action among small-scale farmers has significant progress in Vietnam. First,
there is a resurgent interest in farmer cooperatives. In Vietnam, agricultural production
was once solely organized in state cooperatives under a central planning economy system.
Entire harvest belonged to the cooperatives, and farmers were paid based on their work
points - merely measuring their attendance. Agricultural production stagnated since
the system offered little working motivation. Thanks to drastic reforms in economic
policies, particularly in the Land Law during the 1980s and 1990s, vast farmland of state
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cooperative was divided and distributed to families (Wolz and Duong, 2010) 2. Small-
scale farms, where farmers are free to make production decisions, began to flourish, which
greatly boosts agricultural production. Meanwhile, most of the state cooperatives were
dissolved; some were transformed into membership-oriented cooperatives - hereafter,
transformed cooperatives - but have little operation (Wolz and Duong, 2010; Scholl et
al., 2016).
Nonetheless, due to the aforementioned changes in modern food markets, there is an urge
for collective activities among small-scale farmers. Cooperative Law, adopted in 1997,
was revised in 2012 to facilitate the establishment of new farmer-owned cooperatives.
Those new cooperatives are founded by a small number of farmers (between 10 and 60),
who focus more on selling only one type of agricultural product (Naziri et al., 2014).
These characteristics are different from the transformed cooperatives, which often have
large membership (between 200 and 2,000) and focus on input services (e.g., irrigation
and electricity) for paddy crops (Naziri et al., 2014).
A similar pattern of development can be seen for tea cooperatives. State tea cooperatives,
which owned vast tea plantation, were dissolved in the 1990s, followed by a surge in the
number of small-scale tea farms. Groups of those smallholder tea farmers then found
their own tea cooperatives with the primary objective being to market their tea products
collectively. Although there is no official number available, many new tea cooperatives
have been established typically in central areas for tea production such as the northern
mountainous area.
Second, voluntary certification schemes for groups of small-scale farmers have gained
popularity. One important motive is to facilitate the incorporation of Vietnam’s foods
and beverages into international supply chains (Mergenthaler et al., 2009c). Emerging
food safety concerns caused by the overuse of agrochemicals in small-scale farms and
the rapid expansion of modern retailers are also important drivers (Mergenthaler et
al., 2009b; Nguyen, 2017). Both international and domestic certification schemes are
available for various food products from crops, animal livestock to aquaculture.
Two types of certification are currently being adopted by small-scale tea farmers: Vi-
etGAP and UTZ. VietGAP is a domestic set of standards launched in 2008 by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development following ASEAN’s announcement of its
GAP standards in 2006. Whereas, UTZ is a well-established label with more stringent
international standards. Notably, neither VietGAP nor UTZ strictly requires organic
2 Note that private land ownership is not allowed in Vietnam, farmers however have the right to use
the agricultural land up to 50 years. The land-use rights are transferable on land markets and can be
used as collateral for economic transactions.
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Figure 2.1: Thai Nguyen province, Vietnam
production. Instead, certified farmers are allowed an appropriate use of synthetic fer-
tilizers and chemical pesticides. Equally important, neither of these labels guarantees
a minimum price for certified products. As of March 2018, there were 68 VietGAP-
certified tea groups in operation nationwide, whereas there was only one UTZ-certified
tea cooperative (VietGAP, 2018; UTZ, 2018).
2.2 Small-scale tea farmers in Thai Nguyen
Thai Nguyen is a province in the northern mountainous area – the largest center for tea
production in Vietnam. Figure 2.1 shows the location of Thai Nguyen. The province
has attractive characteristics for studying collective action among small-scale farmers in
Vietnam
Thai Nguyen is a leading province of tea production in Vietnam. In 2016, the provincial
harvested area was 17,380 ha, and total fresh tea production was 194,200 tons (GSO,
2016). Only Lam Dong province, located in the central highlands region of Vietnam,
presents higher figures. However, Lam Dong specializes in producing black tea for export;
whereas Thai Nguyen’s main product is green tea. Thai Nguyen boasts the most famous
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brands for specialty green tea in domestic markets which consume up to 90 percent of
provincial green tea production. Only a few products are exported to foreign markets.
In addition, as thousands of small-scale farmers are principle contributor to tea produc-
tion, collective action among tea farmers has developed significantly in Thai Nguyen.
Local policy-makers encourage the establishment of farmer cooperatives to facilitate
market access through collective marketing of tea products. According to the provin-
cial statistics, there were 35 registered tea cooperatives as of March 2017. Two of them
were previously state-owned cooperatives. They have more than 60 members and are
under the process of transformation. The rest 33 cooperatives are new farmer-owned
cooperatives with member size from 7 to 46. Among the 33 cooperatives, 30 were just
established since 2011 afterward.
The tea cooperatives function primarily at the selling stage; tea growing and processing
are still conducted in individual households. The cooperative members - mainly coop-
erative managers - seek large-scale buyers for their tea products. If tea is sold through
cooperatives, dried tea is packaged under the brands of the cooperatives. In only a few
cooperatives where collective processing devices are available, cooperative members do
final processing steps and packaging together.
Moreover, Thai Nguyen is the most active location for the development of tea certification
in Vietnam. The only UTZ-certified tea cooperative and 40 of the 68 VietGAP-certified
groups are based in the province. VietGAP certification is flourishing, partly owing to
subsidy programs from the local and central governments. The subsidy programs cover
the certification fee when farmer groups are in the first two-year certification period.
After the subsidy period, the groups must pay the costs on their own if they wish to
continue certified production. However, in many cases, because funding is available in
their communes or districts, groups that extend VietGAP certification after the first
two-year period are still able to receive support for paying the certification fee. It noted
that certification groups sometimes include tea cooperative members; however, they can
also simply be farmer groups that are solely focused on producing certified tea rather
than engaging in collective marketing.
Due to those above characteristics, tea production in Thai Nguyen offers an ideal case
study for collective action among small-scale farmers.
2.3 An overview of methods
To answer the research questions, I employ two methods: Propensity score matching
(PSM) for evaluating the impacts of collective action, and randomized conjoint analysis
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(RCA) for estimating the impacts of design attributes on farmers’ preference. This
section justifies the selection of the two methods.
2.3.1 Propensity score matching
To see the validity of PSM, it is necessary to overview the potential outcome framework
(Rubin, 1974) for studying treatment effects. Accordingly, consider a scenario where
hypothetical treatment w is binary, as it is the case in this dissertation. For a unit of
observation i in a population of size of N , wi takes on the value 1 for a active treatment
(e.g., a member of marketing cooperatives) and 0 for a control treatment (e.g. non-
member of marketing cooperatives). Yi(wi = 1) denotes the potential outcome level
(e.g., production volume) if unit i receive the active treatment, and Yi(wi = 0) denotes
the potential outcome level if the same unit i at the same time receive the control
treatment. The causal effect of treatment w on unit i (i.e., unit treatment effect) is then
defined as the difference between Yi(wi = 1) and Yi(wi = 0). By averaging the effect on
all units, we have an average treatment effect (ATE).
However, in the real world, we can observe only one of the two potential outcomes for
all i ∈ N . Let Wi = [0, 1] be the real word treatment. Then, we can only observe either
Yi(wi = 1)|Wi = 1 (for units in the treatment group) and Yi(wi = 0)|Wi = 0 (for units
in the control group). We can never observe counterfactual outcomes Yi(wi = 1)|Wi = 0
and Yi(wi = 0)|Wi = 1. Hence, unit treatment effect and average treatment effect
cannot be calculated. The fact that only one of the potential outcomes is observed is
called "the fundamental problem of causal inference" (Holland, 1986). Estimation of the
counterfactual outcomes is the most critical challenge in impact evaluation studies
A randomized control trial, where treatment status is randomly assigned, is ideal for
estimating the causal effect. In this condition, because of random assignment, we can
generate the treatment and control groups that are identical in all background charac-
teristics. Thus, the average outcome level of the control group (E(Yi(wi = 0)|Wi = 0))
is an unbiased estimate for the potential outcome of the treatment group had it not been
treated (E(Yi(wi = 0)|Wi = 1)). Similarly, the average outcome level of the treatment
group (E(Yi(wi = 1)|Wi = 1)) is an unbiased estimate for the potential outcome of the
control group had it been treated (E(Yi(wi = 0)|Wi = 1)). Subsequently, we can esti-
mate simply ATE by taking the difference in the outcome level between the treatment
and the control group. In addition to ATE, there are many occasions when we are inter-
ested in the treatment effect on the people who are targets of a program. Thus, another
highly common causal quantity is average treatment on the treated (ATET) (Heckman
Overviews of study sites and methods 16
and Smith, 1999), which is estimated by equation 2.1.
τATET = E[Y (w = 1|W = 1)]− E[(Y (w = 0|W = 1)] (2.1)
In observational studies, treatment assignment is often non-random (or endogenous),
such as membership of marketing cooperatives and certification groups. Instead, treat-
ment status is self-selected. As a result of the self-selection problem, treatment and
control groups are essentially different in their characteristics. A simple difference in the
outcome of the two groups masks the influence of factors that impact both with treat-
ment status and outcome – covariates X. For instance, size of agricultural land owned
by small-scale farmers can affect their cooperative membership since the marketing coop-
eratives often prioritize farmers with large landholding. On the other hand, agricultural
landholding obviously affects total production. A simple difference in production volume
between coop members and non-members, therefore, include the impact of agricultural
landholding, rather than the coop membership itself, on production.
Propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) is widely applied in
impact evaluation using observational data. PSM belongs to a family of matching al-
gorithms, whose basic idea is to find of similar groups of control and treatment units
regarding all covariates X. Subsequently, the counterfactual averaged outcome of the
treatment group had it not been treated, for example, is estimated by averaging outcomes
of the matched control group. The matching approach is based on two assumptions. The
first assumption is unconfoundedness (or conditional independence assumption), mean-
ing that potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment, conditioning on
the same X. The second assumption is overlap (or common support assumption), requir-
ing all units with the same X to have a positive probability of receiving the treatment.
When the two assumptions hold, ATET can be estimated as given in equation 2.2.
τATET = EX|W=1[E(Y (w = 1|W = 1, X)− E(Y (w = 0|W = 0, X)] (2.2)
When there are a number of potential X – high dimensional vector X, matching on
all X is difficult. Thus, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggested matching based on the
propensity score P (W = 1|X) (or simply P (X)) - the probability for a unit to receive the
treatment given the observed covariates X. They proved that if the unconfoundedness
assumption holds conditional on all X, it also holds conditional on P (X). Equation 2.3
shows PSM estimator for ATET.
τATET = EP (X)|W=1{E[Y (w = 1|W = 1, P (X))]− E[Y (w = 0|W = 0, P (X))]} (2.3)
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The PSM method involves two major steps, although some studies developed detailed
procedures with more steps (e.g., Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The first step is to
estimate the propensity score, which often uses probit or logit models. Based on the
estimated propensity score, treatment and control units are matched. Various matching
algorithms are available (see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a discussion). In this
dissertation, I only select one-nearest-neighbor matching for its simplicity. The second
step is to estimate treatment effects on outcome variables. As indicated in 2.3, PSM
estimator is the mean difference in outcomes over the common support weighed by the
distribution of the propensity score.
PSM is widely applied in impact evaluation studies in diverse fields, partly because it is
suitable for simple cross-sectional data. Regarding collective action among small-scale
farmers in developing countries, a vast number of studies use PSM to estimate its effects
(e.g. Chagwiza et al., 2016; Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Giuliani et al., 2017; Jena et al.,
2012; Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2015) Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, this
study also applies PSM to estimate economic impacts of marketing cooperatives and
certification groups (chapter 3 and 4). Chapter 3 will further elaborate on the detailed
PSM procedure.
2.3.2 Randomized conjoint analysis
This dissertation uses RCA – one type of choice experiment – to study impacts of the
design attributes on farmers’ stated preference of certification programs in chapter 5.
Stated preference experiments, or choice experiments, are highly popular in various fields
of social sciences. Ideally, impacts of design attributes on people preferences are revealed
by conducting randomized field experiments, due to the aforementioned fundamental
problem of causal inference. However, it takes a huge amount of resources to conduct
field experiments. Further, if researchers want to have multiple combinations of design
attributes, field experiments can hardly be implemented. Compared to revealed pref-
erences through field randomized experiments, stated preferences are much less costly
to elicit through choice experiments. Choice experiments typically ask respondents to
choose from or rank hypothetical alternatives of a policy, a product or a service with dif-
ferent combinations of design attributes. Hence, design of the choice experiment allows
researchers to study the impacts of attributes on hypothetical choice (stated preference)
of the respondents. Because of their affordable costs and design flexibility, choice exper-
iments are widely used in marketing, politics and economics.
Many studies also conducted choice experiments in the context of policies or services
involving small-scale farmers (e.g., Abebe et al., 2013; Schipmann and Qaim, 2011;
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Meemken et al., 2017). However, due to the design of their choice experiments, causal
impacts of design attributes can hardly be estimated. To be more specific, almost all
studies employed d-optimal design, which imposes restrictions on sets of attribute lev-
els appearing in choice tasks. Consequently, such partly randomization renders serious
statistical challenges for estimating effects of attributes levels on the choice decision.
Hainmueller et al. (2014) suggested a new design of the randomized conjoint analysis
(RCA) to overcome the shortcoming of the conventional choice experiments. Due to a
full randomization design of attribute levels, attribute position and pairs of alternatives,
RCA can achieve equal distribution of all potential confounders across choice tasks.
Thus, casual impacts of design attributes could be non-parametrically identified under
the potential outcome framework.
The causal quantity estimated from the new RCA design is the average marginal com-
ponent effect (AMCE). AMCE measure impacts of attributes on the choice probability
of a hypothetical alternative. I adopt notations and instructions from Hainmueller et al.
(2014) to demonstrate how AMCE is estimated.
Consider a scenario where each respondent i in a sample of N completes K choice
tasks. In each choice task kth ∈ K, respondent i choose from or ranks J hypothetical
alternatives. A hypothetical alternative (a profile) consists of L attributes, and attribute
l has Dl levels. The alternative faced by respondent i in alternative jth of kth choice
task is denoted as Tijk, and Tijkl represent lth attribute of the alternative. Yijk denotes
choice outcome of respondent i for alternative jth of choice task kth
The AMCE is estimated based on two assumptions. The first assumption is no effects of
the round of choice tasks and the order of alternatives on choice outcomes 3. The second
is full randomization. Under these two assumptions, AMCE of a change in the level of
attribute l from t0 to t1 is defined by the following equation
ˆ¯pi(t1, t0) = Y¯ij|Tijl=t1 − Y¯ij|Tijl=t0 (2.4)
where Y¯ij|Tijk=t1 and Y¯ij|Tijk=t0 are conditional average of observed choice outcomes.
Nonparametric estimators of the AMCE of attribute levels can be obtained by linearly
regressing observed outcome Yij on dummy variables for the levels of Tijl. The linear
regression model is as follows:
3 Under this assumption, Yijk and Tijkl can be simply referred as Yij and Tijl
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Yij = β0 +
L∑
l=1
Dl−1∑
d=1
βldWijl + u (2.5)
where Wijl is the vectors of Dl − 1 dummy variables for the levels of Tijl excluding the
one for Tijl = t0. βld is the AMCE estimator of a change in attribute l from t0 to
td. A robust standard error of the AMCE, also estimated from the regression model,
is clustered at the respondent level to correct for correlations between choice outcome
within one respondent.
Since the two assumptions of the new RCA design can be easily satisfied, this method
offers a powerful tool to study the causal impacts of design attributes on choice prob-
ability. Many recent studies have applied this method to measure the causal effects of
program attributes in different contexts (e.g., Gampfer et al., 2014; Hninn et al., 2017;
Sydavong et al., 2019). Therefore, I consider RCA as an ideal approach to study the
impacts of design attributes on small-scale farmers’ preferences of certification programs.
Detailed design and implementation of the RCA will be specified in chapter 5.
Chapter 3
Impacts of marketing cooperatives
on small-scale farm income
3.1 Introduction
Collective marketing through farmer cooperatives – or marketing cooperatives – helps
reduce transaction costs of marketing products from small-scale farms. When there are
opportunities to reach new high-value markets, a group of smallholder farmers could
share the transaction costs of market access (Markelova et al., 2009). Further, by selling
products together, small farmers can improve bargaining power, and reduce price un-
certainty (Cakir and Balagtas, 2012; Agbo et al., 2015). Both effects might eventually
lead to higher production, selling price and income for small-scale farmers. Therefore,
collective marketing is usually a principal component for the establishment of farmer
cooperatives.
A significant body of literature evaluates the economic impacts of membership in co-
operatives where collective marketing is a key component. Studies cover various major
crops for small-scale farmers in developing countries. For example, Abdul-Rahaman and
Abdulai (2018) measure effects on rice farmers in Ghana. Fischer and Qaim (2012) an-
alyzed impacts of banana cooperatives in Kenya. Effects of cooperative membership on
apple farmers in China were studied by Ma and Abdulai (2016) and Hao et al. (2018)
Roy and Thorat (2008) presented a case study on Indian grape, while the impacts of
cooperatives on small-scale coffee farms were reported in Wollni and Zeller (2007).
Despite the importance of tea crop, very few empirical evidence of the effects of marketing
cooperative on small-scale tea farmers. Chapter 1 explains the significance of small-scale
tea farming for millions of livelihoods in developing countries. As with other crops,
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smallholder tea farmers have great difficulties at the marketing stage, and collective
marketing is a promising solution. However, I am not aware of any empirical studies
examining the impacts of marketing cooperatives on small-scale tea farmers in developing
countries.
Benefits from marketing cooperatives depend on product types and their potential mar-
kets. For example, staple crops (e.g., rice, potato and wheat) offer little gain from col-
lective action, because they are often locally sold at the farm gate or wholesale markets.
Whereas, marketing cooperatives can play a significant role in high-value agricultural
products (Markelova et al., 2009). Processed tea products are able to move beyond lo-
cal markets and penetrate various high-value markets, such as supermarkets, restaurant
chains and export markets. Further, since tea has a special cultural value, high-value
specialty tea products are popular in many Asian countries. Collective marketing of such
specialty tea products to modern retailers could be profitable to small-scale tea farm-
ers. Therefore, tea gives a compelling case study for the economic impacts of marketing
cooperative on small-scale farmers.
This study contributes to previous literature by evaluating the impacts of marketing
cooperatives on small-scale green tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. As mention
in Chapter 2, Thai Nguyen province is a center for specialty green tea production in
Vietnam, and collective marketing through cooperatives have re-emerged rapidly. To
achieve the research objective, this study analyzes an original sample of 329 smallholder
green tea farmers, among which 75 are cooperative members. Propensity score matching
(PSM) is applied to account for the self-selection bias in the impact evaluation.
The rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 specifies the methods for data collection
and data analysis. Section 3.3 reports the results, and a discussion of the findings is
presented in section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes and gives implications.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Study site and sampling method
The data in the study come from a household survey conducted in July and August
2017. The survey targeted four groups of green tea farmers: members of marketing
cooperatives, members of certified tea groups, members of both cooperatives and certified
groups, and farmers who were not members of cooperatives or certified groups. A two-
step sampling procedure was employed: the first step dealt with the selection of study
regions within Thai Nguyen province, and the second addressed household sampling.
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Figure 3.1: Four central tea farming regions in Thai Nguyen province, Vietnam
In the first step, I purposively selected the 4 regions with the most famous local specialty
green tea brands in Thai Nguyen 1. Specific locations of the four study sites are illustrated
in Figure 3.1. These regions have a long tradition of green tea cultivation, and almost
every household owns a tea farm. Importantly, these regions exhibit high densities of tea
cooperatives and certified groups. Regarding resource constraints, the region selection
is the first step towards identifying a sufficient sample of treated observations to study.
The first region, named Tan Cuong, is the most well-known in Vietnam for specialty
green tea production. The Tan Cuong region is located in the outskirts of Thai Nguyen
city and consists of three communes: Phuc Xuan, Phuc Triu and Tan Cuong. The other
three regions are Tuc Tranh, La Bang and Trai Cai, which are located in the districts
surrounding the city. Tuc Tranh and La Bang regions each contains one commune with
a similar name. Trai Cai region has two communes: Minh Lap and Hoa Binh.
When the survey was conducted, there was one UTZ certified cooperative, 3 VietGAP
1 The term “region” does not denote an administrative level. Regarding formal administrative levels
in Vietnam, from the highest to the lowest, they are divided primarily into province, city or district, and
commune. Below the commune, the village is a semi-formal administrative level where village leaders
are part-time administrators. The locations of the four study regions are identified by communes to
which the registered local tea brands refer. Each of the four regions is located within one district, but
it might contain more than one commune.
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certified cooperatives, 4 VietGAP certified groups and 15 tea cooperatives without any
certification operating in the 7 communes mentioned above. The survey successfully
accessed totally 18 cooperatives and certification groups: including all 4 certified co-
operatives, 4 certified groups, and 10 non-certified cooperatives. Among those farmer
organizations, 15 was established within the last 6 years. Two certified cooperatives were
established in 2001, but they only started operation in marketing and group certification
in 2011. The rest cooperative had VietGAP certification from 2008, but remained largely
inactive after the certificate expired in 2010.
The leaders of the cooperatives and certification groups were interviewed based on a
questionnaire. According to the interviews, all cooperatives and groups were supplying
specialty green tea to domestic markets only. The UTZ cooperative, despite adopting
an internationally recognized standard, had few exports to North America in 2014 and
2015. Member lists of the cooperatives and certification groups were also provided by
their leaders during the meetings. In addition, village leaders provided household lists
for the villages where the cooperative or certification groups are based.
In the second step, households were sampled for face-to-face interviews. Due to the rel-
atively small numbers of cooperative members and certified producers, all of them were
interviewed when possible. The control households, which were members of neither a
cooperative nor a certification group, were randomly selected from households living in
the same villages as the treatment groups based on the lists of villagers (17 villages in
total). In every village, I sampled an approximately equal number of control and treat-
ment households regardless of whether the treatment was membership in a marketing
cooperative, a certification group, or both. Household representatives were invited to
come to village centers where the interviews took place. If a selected household, espe-
cially a treated household, was unable to travel to the venue, the investigators visited
the home to conduct the interviews.
Household information was collected by seven investigators who were staff at Thai
Nguyen University of Agriculture and Forestry using a smartphone-based questionnaire
in Vietnamese 2. In detail, the questionnaire first asked information regarding household
rosters, land ownership and membership in cooperatives and certified groups as of the
end of April 2017. Importantly, the questionnaire focused on information about house-
hold tea production. The household representatives were asked for information on tea
farm characteristics, devices used for tea production, detailed tea sales and input use
during the last 12 months (i.e., from the beginning of May 2016 to the end of April 2017)
2 The household survey used ODK Collect, an open source Android application for smartphones, to
accelerate the interview process and data entry. Prior to the main survey, a pilot survey was conducted
in February and March 2017 with a sample of 107 households. During the pilot, the investigators were
trained to use the smartphone-based questionnaire. The questionnaire was also revised according to
insights into local tea production gained from the pilot survey.
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Coop member 60 75 135
Non-coop member 87 254 341
Total 147 329 476
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Figure 3.2: Data structure
3. The household representatives were also asked to report total cash income and costs
for other agricultural and non-agricultural livelihoods in the last 12 months. Ownership
of important durable assets was also recorded. Each household interview took approxi-
mately 35 minutes on average, and the household representatives were given 50,000 VND
(approx. 2.5 USD) for taking part in the survey.
3.2.2 Data and variable selection
In total, a sample of 481 households was collected through the household survey. Five
households that did not report tea production in the survey period or could not complete
important sections of the questionnaire were excluded, leaving a total of 476 households.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the number of households by treatment statuses, i.e. member-
ship in cooperatives and certification groups.
To evaluate the impacts of marketing cooperatives, this study uses a subset of the data
to construct treatment and control groups. On one hand, for the treatment group, I
only select the 75 non-certified coop members, rather than all coop members regardless
of their certification status. This selection is to ensure that the estimated effects can
be purely attributed to members of the marketing cooperatives. On the other hand,
the control groups consist of 254 non-certified, non-coop households. As a result, we
analyzed a subset of 329 households
3 The decision to consider this period eases farmers’ recall of their tea production because the main
tea harvesting season starts in early May.
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From the data, basic indicators of tea farm performance as outcome variables are selected,
covering tea farm size, sales volume, fresh production and farm expenses. Furthermore,
I compute tea yield, average selling price and net income from the tea farm for each
household and use them as additional outcome variables.
Furthermore, potential covariates, predetermined factors that can affect both treatment
status and outcome variables, are chosen from the household characteristics. 16 co-
variates are selected in total. A detailed description of the selected covariates and the
outcome variables is provided in Table A.1 of Appendix A. Among the covariates and out-
come variables, eight are clearly unaffected by the treatment, including the city dummy,
market distance, family and labor sizes (i.e., family members aged from 15 to 65), the
female-headed household dummy, age and education of the household head, and eth-
nicity of the household head. The rest of the variables are seemingly less exogenous
or time-invariant. Thus, I cautiously justify the selection of these variables. Village
leadership and agricultural landholdings can be assumed to be time-invariant. Village
leaders typically maintain their positions for years. Similarly, landholdings are primar-
ily inherited from previous generations, and agricultural land transactions are very few.
A credit dummy is also included as a plausible covariate 4. The final covariates are a
set of separate variables indicating ownership of valuable assets to capture the effects
of household wealth. The motorbike ratio (i.e., the number of motorbikes owned by
a household divided by family size), car dummy and computer dummy are unlikely to
be affected by collective marketing or certification, which has been initiated recently.
The number of tea-roasting machines increases only if the household production scale
increases dramatically, which is not typically the case for both of the treatments 5.
3.2.3 Data analysis
This study employs PSM to mitigate the self-selection bias associated with the observable
covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The method constructs the counterfactual by
matching observations with those of the other treatment status based on their propensity
scores, estimated for each observation using a set of observed covariates. Under the un-
confoundedness assumption, the average treatment effects can be estimated by averaging
the difference in the outcomes of the matched treated and control observations. Average
treatment effects on the treated (ATETs) are estimated because of the limited sample
4 Membership of cooperatives or certification groups may also affect credit demand. Therefore, in
the analyses, I dropped the control for the credit dummy in some models. Consistent results were still
observed.
5 One noteworthy limitation is that with the cross-sectional data, it is hard to prove that the covariates
that we control for are truly time-invariant or exogenous to the treatment. The covariates are selected
based on their selection in previous studies using matching techniques and my qualitative knowledge of
the study sites.
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size of the treatment group. This study applies a two-step process to obtain estimated
ATET for each of the outcome variables. In doing so, I adopt several major recommen-
dations from Imbens and Rubin (2015) and Abadie and Imbens (2016). The following
subsections elaborate on the implementation.
a. The first step: Matching to improve balance
The purpose of the first step is to obtain a balanced sample with respect to the selected
covariates after matching.
As is standard, I first use the treated and control observations to estimate propensity
scores by using Probit models. One critical point here concerns the specification of the
Probit models. As suggested in Imbens and Rubin (2015), there is no point in attempting
to obtain a value that is as close as possible to the true propensity score. Instead, it
is more important to have estimated propensity scores that lead to a balanced matched
sample. I therefore specify 10 models with different combinations of covariates to find
those with the best matching quality.
Next, the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching technique is applied based on the propen-
sity scores estimated by each Probit model. I apply a caliper of 0.01 to avoid bad matches.
Treated units for which no control units can be found within the specified caliper are
excluded. Moreover, I employ matching with replacement, meaning that a control ob-
servation can be used more than once for matching.
Finally, following Imbens and Rubin (2015), I check the balance under each model af-
ter matching by treating selected covariates as pseudo-outcome variables and estimating
pseudo-ATETs on them 6. To examine the statistical significance of the pseudo-ATETs,
their standard errors are estimated following Abadie and Imbens (2016) 7. Good match-
ing should have pseudo-ATETs that are close to zero and statistically insignificant, as
this implies the plausibility of the unconfoundedness assumption. Based on such criteria,
I select all satisfied models to proceed to the next step
Note that the unconfoundedness assumption is often less plausible when there are unob-
served covariates. However, even when unobserved covariates exist, if I select appropriate
observed covariates, the back-door criterion could still be satisfied (Pearl, 1995). For ex-
ample, high motivation for tea farming usually leads to more investment in production
assets, which ultimately affects the outcomes of interest. By controlling for the observed
6 Imbens and Rubin (2015) estimate pseudo-ATEs on covariates after stratification matching. I apply
this practice to the one-to-one nearest neighbor matching.
7 The bootstrap method, which is often used in empirical studies employing PSM, does not provide
reliable estimates of the standard error for ATET estimated by nearest neighbor matching (Abadie and
Imbens, 2008). The method of Abadie and Imbens (2016) accounts for the fact that the propensity is
estimated.
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number of tea-roasting machines, which is not likely to be affected by the treatments, I
can mitigate the endogeneity caused by unobserved motivation. Thus, it is still possible
to identify causal effects by PSM.
b. The second step: Estimating ATETs
For each selected model, the ATETs for the outcome variables are estimated based on
equation 2.3 in chapter 2. The term E[Y (wi = 1)|Wi = 1, P (X)] is estimated by av-
eraging the realized outcomes of the non-certified cooperative members. The counter-
factual term, E[Y (wi = 0)|Wi = 1, P (X)], is estimated by averaging the outcomes of
the matched control farmers, E[Y (wi = 0)|Wi = 0, P (X)]. The standard errors of the
ATETs are estimated following Abadie and Imben (2016) for further statistical tests.
For each outcome variable, in addition to the ATET estimation using the difference in
the means, I also conduct ATET estimation using the difference in the means of the
ranks. I rank households based on their values of the outcome variable with a correction
for ties using all 476 households in the sample. Those ranks are subsequently used in
the ATET estimation instead of ordinary values. Many potential outliers are present in
all the outcome variables, as depicted in Figure A.1 in Appendix A. Since the sample
size is quite limited, the outliers may significantly affect the variance of the estimators.
The transformation into rank outcomes helps improve the efficiency of the estimators,
resulting in more power for the statistical tests (Banerjee and Duflo, 2017, chapter 3,
pp.87). Estimation of ATETs using rank statistics also offers an extra sensitivity check
for the results 8 .
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 reports the results of t-tests for mean differences in the potential covariates
and the outcome variables between the non-certified coop members and control groups.
There is a substantial imbalance in the selected covariates. First, the difference in the
city dummy is a result of the sample selection. Control households were sampled with
a slightly higher proportion in city area, i.e., the Tan Cuong region. However, because
there were only a few non-certified cooperatives in the city, the mean statistics are
significantly smaller for the treated group. By contrast, as I will show in chapter 4,
certified cooperatives were mostly located in the city. This could suggest a regional
effect on the certification status of the cooperatives. I intentionally incorporate the city
8 However, for labor costs, the ATET estimators using rank statistics are less reliable, because there
are many observations with zero labor costs (Banerjee and Duflo, 2017, chapter 3, pp.87).
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1
Non-certified coop 
members
Control group Difference
(n = 75) (n=254)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.E.
Potential covariates
City dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.31 0.46 0.58 0.49 -0.28*** 0.06
Market distance (km) 1.71 0.93 1.98 1.23 -0.28* 0.15
Family size 3.84 1.40 4.00 1.27 -0.16 0.17
Labor size 2.93 0.99 2.85 0.96 -0.09 0.12
Female-headed dummy (1=yes, 0 =no) 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 -0.01 0.05
Age of the household head 51.44 9.91 48.32 11.84 3.12** 1.50
Education of the household head (years) 7.88 2.22 7.12 2.55 0.76** 0.33
Kinh ethnic head dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.92 0.27 0.94 0.24 -0.02 0.03
Village leader dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.19 0.39 0.09 0.29 0.09** 0.04
Credit dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.61 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.12* 0.07
Total agricultural land holding (Thousand m2) 8.07 6.02 7.41 7.50 0.67 0.94
Cropland holding (Thousand m2) 4.27 2.86 4.07 2.20 0.20 0.31
Motorbike ratio 0.63 0.34 0.52 0.25 0.11*** 0.04
Computer dummy (1=yes, 0= no) 0.32 0.47 0.20 0.40 0.12** 0.05
Car dummy (1=yes, 0= no) 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.03
Number of roasting machines 1.33 0.58 1.24 0.73 0.10 0.09
Outcome variables
Sales value (Mil. VND) 135.00 107.82 91.09 72.52 43.91*** 10.76
Fresh production (Ton) 3.55 2.87 2.59 1.73 0.96*** 0.27
Tea farm size (ha) 0.34 0.27 0.29 0.18 0.04* 0.03
Productivity  (Ton/ha) 11.23 4.61 9.41 4.55 1.83*** 0.60
Average price (Mil. VND/ Ton) 38.43 15.52 35.00 12.98 3.43* 1.79
Input costs (Mil. VND) 17.33 12.06 15.74 10.03 1.59 1.38
Labor costs (Mil. VND) 10.32 14.10 4.84 7.41 5.49*** 1.23
Net income (Mil. VND) 107.34 91.80 70.51 64.14 36.83*** 9.38
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Table 3.1: Mean differences: Non-certified coop members vs. Control households
dummy in order to control for the potential regional difference between the Tan Cuong
and the other three regions.
Differences in the rest household-level covariates imply the self-selected problem. Com-
pared to the control households, coop members live closer to the markets. Their house-
hold heads are also older, more highly educated and more likely to have leading positions
in the villages. Credit dummy shows higher mean statistics for the treatment group, but
it is marginally significant. Although members of the treatment group do not own a
significantly larger land area, there are large differences in indicators of asset holdings,
including the motorbike ratio and the computer dummy.
In addition to the imbalance in the observed covariates, there could also be an imbalance
in the unobserved covariates. For instance, motivation is usually an unobserved factor.
Motivated tea farmers are more likely to participate in cooperatives, and their farming
performance also might be better than the performance of those with little motivation for
tea farming. Furthermore, balance in the knowledge of tea farming, which can positively
affect both coop membership and farm outcome, cannot be easily verified.
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Regarding the outcome variables, the treated units present significantly higher mean
values than the control units on all variables except for the input costs. For instance, the
value of the former’s tea sales is nearly 1.5 times that of the latter’s tea sales. Similarly,
fresh production, farm size, productivity and labor costs are significantly larger for the
treatment group.
However, households self-selected whether to participate in the cooperative. The dif-
ferences in the outcomes could result from the initial imbalance in the characteristics
between the treated and control households rather than from the effects of the programs
themselves. For example, coop members have a higher sales value than the control
households because the former are older farmers and so more experienced in tea farming,
rather than because coop participation improves their farm sales. In other words, simple
mean comparisons of the outcome variables between the two groups lead to heavily bi-
ased conclusions about the treatment effects. Thus, to identify causality, I rely on PSM
estimators which account for the self-selection in the treatment status.
3.3.2 ATETs of marketing cooperatives
1
Before matching After matching
(n = 401) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E
City dummy -0.28*** 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 -0.04 0.07
Market distance -0.28* 0.15 0.06 0.21 -0.20 0.18 0.04 0.18 -0.04 0.20 0.31 0.20
Family size -0.16 0.17 -0.10 0.29 0.14 0.26 -0.32 0.25 -0.15 0.25 -0.10 0.27
Labor size -0.09 0.12 0.09 0.23 0.14 0.18 -0.01 0.20 0.01 0.19 0.14 0.20
Female-headed dummy -0.01 0.05 0.09 0.07 -0.09 0.08 0.03 0.07 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.08
Age of the household head 3.12** 1.50 3.09 2.31 0.52 1.95 0.81 1.91 -0.48 2.14 0.07 1.89
Education of the household head 0.76** 0.33 -0.76 0.59 -0.02 0.52 0.04 0.46 0.04 0.45 -0.44 0.42
Kinh ethnic head dummy -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.05
Village leader dummy 0.09** 0.04 0.07 0.08 -0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.07
Credit dummy 0.12* 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.10
Total agricultural land holding 0.67 0.94 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.10 -0.09 0.12 0.01 0.12
Cropland holding 0.20 0.31 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.05
Motorbike ratio 0.11*** 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07
Computer dummy 0.12** 0.05 -0.07 0.10 -0.05 0.10 -0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.09 0.11 0.08
Car dummy 0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03
Number of roasting machines 0.10 0.09 -0.12 0.13 -0.09 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.12
67 matches 65 matches 68 matches 67 matches 73 matches
In each model, boldface numbers indicate corresponding covariates are included in the Probit model. 
A caliper of 0.01 is applied for one nearest neighbor matching based on propensity score.
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Table 3.2: Balancing check: Non-certified coop members vs. Control households
Table 3.2 illustrates the results of the first step in the PSM procedure. Among 10 models,
five satisfy the selection criteria. In the 5 models, mean differences in covariates that
are significantly different between the two groups before matching, such as city dummy,
market distance, age and education of the household head, become statistically insignif-
icant after matching. Moreover, for almost all covariates, the magnitudes of the mean
differences are also reduced sharply to nearly zero. In some models, the balance in co-
variates is not much improved, for example, the age and education of the household head
in model 1, but the mean differences remain statistically insignificant after matching. I
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therefore still consider them as valid models and examine the consistency of the ATETs
for each outcome variable across all the five models.
The results of ATET estimation using the differences in means, the second step, are
reported in Table 3.3. In general, the estimators lack consistency, especially in the
results of statistical tests, across the five models. Membership of marketing cooperatives
increases sales value, average price and net income for tea farmers. Nonetheless, the
positive values and statistical significance of the estimators fluctuate considerably. For
example, the impact on sales value is relatively large, more than 40 Million VND, and
significant at 5 percent level in model 1 and model 5. However, in the rest three models,
the impact reduces to around 30 Million VND and is only significant at the 10 percent
level. Likewise, ATET on average price become insignificant in model 2, although the
estimators are significant at more than 5 Million VND/ ton in the rest four models.
1
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E.
Sales value (Mil. VND) 43.59** 16.22 32.19* 17.72 33.61* 15.14 29.70* 16.36 42.22** 18.13
Fresh production (Ton) 0.61* 0.33 0.63* 0.38 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.66 0.46
Tea farm size (ha) 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.42 0.02 0.45 0.13 0.43
Productivity  (Ton/ha) 2.06** 0.93 0.79 0.95 1.00 0.85 0.96 0.82 1.63* 0.87
Average price (Mil. VND/ Ton) 5.64* 3.34 3.51 3.44 5.16** 2.51 5.52** 2.75 5.92*** 2.09
Input costs (Mil. VND) -0.39 2.39 0.05 2.12 0.12 2.02 1.07 2.04 -0.61 2.52
Labor costs (Mil. VND) 5.41** 2.40 4.27* 2.35 4.07* 2.15 3.43 2.47 3.93 2.41
Net income (Mil. VND) 38.57** 13.84 27.87* 15.71 29.41** 12.73 25.20* 13.87 38.91** 15.23
67 matches 65 matches 68 matches 67 matches 73 matches
A caliper of 0.01 is applied for one nearest neighbor matching based on propensity score.
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Table 3.3: ATET using mean statistics: Non-certified coop members vs. Control
households
I also cannot see any significant and consistent impacts on the rest outcome variables.
Positive impacts can be seen fresh production, productivity and labor costs, but in
many models, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are not different from zero.
Meanwhile, ATETs of tea farm size and input costs are small and insignificant in all the
five models.
The poor consistency of the estimated ATETs is possibly derived from large proportions
of potential outliers in all outcome variables. Therefore, I use the same 5 selected models
to estimate ATETs on all outcome variables converted into ranks. Results of this analysis
are shown in Table 3.4 As can be seen, even after the rank transformation, consistent
estimated ATETs cannot be found for any outcome variables. ATETs on sales value and
net income are only significant and positive in model 1 and 5 but become insignificant
in the rest three models. Estimated impacts on the other outcomes display more or less
similar patterns with those in the analysis using the mean statistics.
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1
A caliper of 0.01 is applied for one nearest neighbor matching based on propensity score.
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E.
Sales value 66.26** 25.35 39.76 24.33 31.91 23.21 23.33 23.31 51.64** 25.86
Fresh production 39.28 24.52 19.81 21.41 8.75 23.34 -0.86 22.42 29.54 25.43
Tea farm size -10.31 25.82 0.18 22.89 -11.59 24.66 -22.71 23.59 -0.03 25.68
Productivity 65.60** 28.48 34.70 28.38 30.79 25.16 30.97 24.11 50.01* 25.81
Average price 69.96** 29.83 48.82* 29.35 43.55 27.15 50.85* 28.77 55.24** 23.81
Input costs -15.70 29.46 -11.84 24.91 -9.68 26.25 -5.19 25.8 -13.11 28.68
Labor costs 57.07** 24.99 39.05 24.54 33.94 23.6 29.44 23.58 27.27 26.2
Net income 71.19** 26.15 45.01* 25.35 33.40 22.25 24.49 22.76 61.00** 25.34
67 matches 65 matches 68 matches 67 matches 73 matches
Table 3.4: ATET using mean statistics: Non-certified coop members vs. Control
households
To sum up, based on the results of the PSM procedure, I cannot find any clear impacts
of marketing cooperatives on the small-scale green tea farmers. Interpretations of the
results are discussed in the following section.
3.4 Discussion
The insignificant ATETs estimators could be derived from the insufficient sample size.
However, there are also other important explanations for the unclear impacts of the mar-
keting cooperatives on income from small-scale green tea farms. This section discusses
two potential reasons, both related to the cooperative membership status.
First, the membership of the marketing cooperative does not necessarily mean active
participation in collective marketing. Only 23 among 75 non-certified coop members
reported having tea sales through cooperatives. On average, sales via tea cooperatives
accounted for 24 percent of the total sales value in the treated group. Especially, the
10 non-certified cooperatives, which consist of 55 among 75 non-certified coop members,
had a low or inactive level of collective marketing. Success in the marketing stage often
depends heavily on cooperative leaders, who were responsible for finding stable buyers of
tea products. The leaders are smallholder tea farmers with limited marketing ability and
financial muscle. As a result, a few cooperatives manage to have revenue from collective
marketing; many fail to function.
To make the problem worse, the membership is sometimes only nominal. The Cooper-
ative Law requires at least 7 members to establish a farmer cooperative. Since newly
established cooperatives are eligible for support from the governments, such as input
Impacts of marketing cooperatives on small-scale farm income 32
subsidy, cooperative founders just list their blood-relative households to satisfy the re-
quirements. Therefore, some cooperative members did not actually have any collective
activities.
Second, I select coop membership as a proxy for collective marketing; however, the
membership may contain other components. For example, before May 2016 (the starting
time for recalling tea production in the survey), 41 among 75 non-certified coop members
reported having produced certified green tea. Further, since marketing cooperatives were
highly promoted by the government and NGOs, the members also received subsidized
processing devices, or agricultural training when the cooperatives were established. Such
supports were widely different across the cooperatives.
Because of the two above reasons, coop membership in the study is an intention-to-
treat for collective marketing with potential divergence in its components. Subsequently,
this study obtains ATETs with a relatively high variance - meaning the statistically
insignificant impacts.
These two issues related to accessing the impacts of collective marketing through farmer
cooperatives are not exclusive to the study. Previous studies also show inactive par-
ticipation among cooperatives members. For instance, Fischer and Qaim (2012) found
positive impacts on farm income only for members who actively participated in collective
marketing through banana cooperatives in Kenya. However, because active participa-
tion itself is endogenous, their interpretation of the results and conclusions might be
negatively affected. Likewise, Mujawamariya et al. (2013) emphasized the severity of
side-selling among members of coffee cooperatives in Rwanda.
Previous studies often defined their treatment as membership of cooperatives (or farmer
organizations) so impacts could hardly be attributed to any particular collective activi-
ties. For instance, Hao et al. (2018) and Ma and Abdulai (2016) reported positive impacts
of cooperative membership on apple farmers in China. Components of the membership
were however different across study sites and covered various collective activities: col-
lective marketing, production services, group acquirement of food safety standard. Sim-
ilarly, studies in Africa (Abdul-Rahaman and Abdulai, 2018; Fischer and Qaim, 2012;
Latynskiy and Berger, 2016, e.g.,), membership of cooperative, or farmer organizations,
was highly diversified in its components, such as collective input purchase, provision of
new technologies, and group marketing.
Hence, I argue that the impact evaluation of marketing cooperatives is prone to mixed
results. In addition, the analysis using membership of marketing cooperative as a treat-
ment also says little about whether collective marketing, or other collective activities, is
effective for small-scale farmers.
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3.5 Conclusions
This study evaluates the impacts farmer marketing cooperatives on income from small-
scale green tea farms. It uses data of 329 small-scale green tea farmers in four central
regions of tea production in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam PSM is utilized to address the self-
selection problem of cooperative membership. The study estimate ATETs on the selected
outcome variables, including sales value, fresh production, farm size, productivity, av-
erage price, input costs, labor costs and net income. I could not find consistent ATET
estimators for any of the outcomes across the models. In addition to the small sample
size, I argue that there are two crucial reasons leading to the unclear impacts. The first
is a low intensity of member participation in collective marketing through the tea coop-
eratives; the second is the diversified treatment components of the membership across
marketing cooperatives. I also point out that these two issues are rather common in the
relevant literature.
Although this study cannot obtain any concrete findings of the impacts of marketing co-
operatives tea farmers, based on the discussion, two implications are induced for broad
literature about farmer cooperatives. First, beyond the nominal membership, studies
should investigate factors encouraging (or hindering) the active participation. To date,
there are quite many studies analyzing determinants of cooperative membership (Bernard
and Spielman, 2009; Mojo et al., 2017; Wollni and Zeller, 2007, e.g.,) Nonetheless, mem-
bership does not equate active participation which is more essential for tangible effects
on farm performance. Very few empirical studies quantitatively examine factors affecting
how intensively small-scale farmers participate in cooperative activities 9. One example
is the study of Fischer and Qaim (2014); however, their findings, based on regression
models, may suffer from bias. Thus, further studies on causal impacts of interventions
at individual or group level on farmers’ active participation in collective activities are
necessary.
Second, impact evaluation of farmer cooperatives should isolate the impacts of specific
collective activities. Because different cooperatives usually offer different sets of collec-
tive actions, it is hard to attribute the average impacts to any individual components.
Given the budget constraint in developing countries, policy-makers and managers of co-
operatives often have a great interest in which specific collective activities (or sets of
them) are effective for improving the welfare of the members. Thus, whenever possible,
future research should shed light on the impacts of a single collective action in order to
give substantial policy implications.
9 Several empirical studies use qualitative methods to address institutional elements facilitating active
collective actions among small-scale farms (J. Barham and Chitemi, 2009; Narrod et al., 2009, e.g.,).
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This study has some shortcomings. The sample size is small, resulting in a weak power
for the statistical tests. Studies with sample size satisfying power calculation, which is
rare in current literature, are needed to produce precise conclusions about the impacts
of marketing cooperatives. Importantly, membership of marketing cooperatives in this
case study also contained group certification of sustainability standards, although the
certificates had been expired. This group certification for small-scale farmers, which itself
has constituted a significant body of literature, may still affect the estimated ATETs
of the marketing cooperatives. Given this limitation and the insight from the second
implication, Chapter 4 presents a case study on the impacts of certification groups,
where members only focus on acquiring certification standards.
Chapter 4
Impacts of voluntary certification on
small-scale farm income
4.1 Introduction
A substantial body of literature analyzes the economic impacts of voluntary certification
on small farms in developing countries. Many studies focus on standards for crops with
well-established links to export markets. This is straightforward because many inter-
national certification schemes were originally designed for crops exported to developed
countries (e.g., Fairtrade, UTZ). Moreover, as consumers in export markets apparently
place greater weight on food certification than do domestic consumers, it is feasible to
assume positive economic effects on the participants.
Research results are mixed (see DeFries et al. (2017) and Oya et al. (2018) and for
reviews). For instance, in several cases, the adoption of sustainability standards by
export coffee farmers is found to increase their selling prices and/or yields (Arnould
et al., 2009; B. L. Barham and Weber, 2012; Chiputwa et al., 2015; Rijsbergen et al.,
2016; Valkila and Nygren, 2010; Vellema et al., 2015). Insignificant economic impacts
on coffee farms have also been reported (Beuchelt and Zeller, 2011; Giuliani et al., 2017;
Jena et al., 2012). A few studies have revealed economic benefits for producers of export
fruits (e.g., Handschuch et al., 2013; Holzapfel and Wollni, 2014; Kleemann et al., 2014;
Subervie and Vagneron, 2013).
Voluntary certification standards are increasingly popular, even in the domestic markets
of developing countries. In many low- and middle-income countries, food systems are
undergoing a significant transformation. On the demand side, among the components of
agricultural sustainability, food safety is increasingly a concern for domestic customers,
35
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mainly owing to rapidly rising living standards (Mergenthaler et al., 2009b). On the sup-
ply side, food standards are more frequently used by supermarkets, which are expanding
their reach in many countries, to distinguish their products from those marketed through
other retail channels (Berdegué et al., 2005; Henson and Reardon, 2005; Holzapfel and
Wollni, 2014). Beyond the penetration of well-known international standards, many na-
tional voluntary certification schemes for good agricultural practices (GAP) have been
developed by governments in developing countries (e.g., VietGAP, ThaiGAP, China-
GAP, ChileGAP). As a result, even for food products without a strong connection to
export markets, an increasing number of small-scale producers are becoming engaged in
certification programs.
However, previous results for certified export crops might not be directly applicable in the
domestic market context for several reasons. Domestic consumers, even in metropolises,
might still have insufficient knowledge of sustainability standards (My et al., 2017), which
constrains the market price premium for certified food products. Furthermore, domes-
tic certification standards are in many cases less stringent than international standards
for export crops because the former adopt some more relaxed standards. For example,
regarding the utilization of plant protection products, the application of integrated pest
management (IPM) is essential for GlobalGAP. However, IPM is only a recommended
practice in VietGAP. Together with dubious enforceability due to underdeveloped au-
diting and sanction systems, consumers many raise concerns about the credibility of
certification schemes. Thus, when empirical evidence remains scarce, it is worthwhile
to examine the economic benefits of certification standards in the context of domestic
markets.
This chapter addresses this literature gap by analyzing the economic impacts of certi-
fication standards on small-scale green tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. Unlike
Vietnam’s tea export products, Thai Nguyen tea farmers produce specialty products
which are typically consumed in the domestic market. Due to a long tradition of green
tea drinking, these specialty products are highly popular among Vietnamese consumers
(Wenner, 2011). This study continues to use the original sample of small-scale green
tea farmers in Thai Nguyen. However, I select different subsets of farmers who actively
participated in voluntary certification group. Thus, in contrast to the results of chapter
3, clear and consistent impacts of the collective action are expected.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 explains the methods of
impact evaluation in detail. Section 4.3 presents the results, and discuss the results is
given in section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
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4.2 Methods
To evaluate the economic impacts of voluntary certification on small-scale farms, this
case study uses the same data and methods as in Chapter 3. However, a different subset
of the data is selected. The PSM procedure is also slightly tailored to the certification
status.
In detail, this study still utilizes the original data on 476 small-scale green tea farmers
in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. Among 4 subgroups of farmers, as depicted in Figure 3.2
in Chapter 3, I select only 3 subgroups for further analyses. The first treatment group
contains 87 certified non-coop members of 4 VietGAP certified groups. These groups
focused exclusively on the acquirement of VietGAP certification. The group members,
however, sold their certified tea products individually rather than collective marketing.
The second treatment group includes 60 certified cooperative members. As explained in
Chapter 3, there is 1 UTZ cooperative with a UTZ and 3 VietGAP. These 60 farmers
not only obtained the certification together as groups, but they could also sell prod-
ucts collectively under the brands of their cooperatives. The impacts therefore can be
attributed to both certification and collective marketing. I intentionally consider the
two treatment groups to examine if there are large differences in their impacts on the
outcome variables. The control group is the same as in Chapter 3, which consists of
254 non-certified, non-coop households. In total, this chapter analyses a sample of 401
smallholder tea farmers, including 147 treated and 254 control observations.
This study also selects the identical outcome variables and covariates for impact evalua-
tion of voluntary certification. Outcome variables are still sales value, fresh production,
farm size, productivity, average selling price, input costs, labor costs and net income
from tea farm. Mean differences in the covariates and outcome variables between the
two treated groups (i.e., certified non-coop members, and certified coop members) and
the control group are shown in Table A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A.
Lastly, regarding data analyses, I duplicate the two-step PSM procedure in chapter 3
to estimate ATETs. Nonetheless, in addition to analyses using all 401 households, I
also run the same PSM procedure but restrict the control observations (control farmers)
to the regions where each of the two treatments is available. I incorporate this analysis
because certification programs or certified cooperatives are not available in all four regions
studied. During the survey period, there were no certified programs in the Trai Cai
region. Furthermore, certified cooperatives are only available in the Tan Cuong and
La Bang regions. Analysis using regions where the treatments do not exist may fall to
account for regional differences between the control and treated households. Therefore,
I report ATET results for all models that satisfy the balancing criteria using the full
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sample and restricted sample. For each outcome variable, I continue to estimate ATETs
on the ordinary values and the rank values. With those variations in sample selection
and outcome statistics, I can thoroughly check the consistency of the findings.
4.3 Results
I first report ATET results when treatment is membership in voluntary certification
groups. I then show ATET results when treatment is membership in certified coopera-
tives. In general, results are fairly similar between the two treatments.
4.3.1 Impacts of voluntary certification
Table 4.1 demonstrates the sample balance results for four selected models. There are
large mean differences in many covariates before matching, such as city dummy, market
distance, family and labor size, landholding, and asset holding. Balance in covariates
improves drastically after matching in all the four models. None of the covariates show
significant differences after matching.
Before matching After matching
(n = 341) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E
City dummy -0.19*** 0.06 -0.09 0.10 -0.10 0.10 -0.07 0.10 -0.07 0.10
Market distance 0.89*** 0.16 -0.20 0.25 -0.17 0.23 0.10 0.25 -0.16 0.24
Family size 0.31** 0.16 -0.03 0.26 0.20 0.27 -0.07 0.26 0.14 0.26
Labor size 0.29** 0.12 -0.23 0.20 -0.23 0.21 -0.07 0.21 0.14 0.21
Female-headed dummy -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.08
Age of the household head 0.04 1.41 -0.26 1.79 0.64 1.99 -0.17 2.10 1.04 2.19
Education of the household head 0.53* 0.31 0.71 0.57 -0.01 0.48 -0.03 0.49 -0.01 0.49
Kinh ethnic head dummy 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.04
Village leader dummy 0.08** 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.07
Credit dummy 0.16** 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.09
Total agricultural land holding 0.21** 0.09 -0.16 0.16 -0.11 0.14 0.05 0.13 -0.03 0.16
Cropland holding 0.17*** 0.03 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.04
Motorbike ratio 0.01 0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.06
Laptop dummy 0.18*** 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.10 -0.10 0.10 -0.04 0.10
Car dummy 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04
Number of roasting machines 0.50*** 0.09 -0.01 0.13 0.04 0.12 -0.13 0.12 -0.14 0.15
70 matches 69 matches 72 matches 72 matches
In each model, boldface numbers indicate corresponding covariates are included in the Probit model. 
A caliper of 0.01 is applied for one nearest neighbor matching based on propensity score.
Model 3 and 4 restricts control farmers to communes where the treatment is available.
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Table 4.1: Balancing check: Certified non-coop members vs. Control households
ATETs estimators using ordinary mean statistics from the four models are shown in
Table 4.2. Compared to results of marketing cooperatives in Chapter 3, this study shows
consistent and positive effects of voluntary certification on small-scale farm performance.
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A caliper of 0.01 is applied for one nearest neighbor matching based on propensity score.
Model 3 and 4 restrict control farmers to communes where the treatment is available.
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E.
Sales value (Mil. VND) 53.23** 22.71 54.78** 22.54 38.51* 21.43 49.45** 21.61
Fresh production (Ton) 0.60 0.41 0.61 0.44 0.16 0.40 0.56 0.40
Tea farm size (ha) 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.04
Productivity  (Ton/ha) 0.84 0.88 0.26 0.97 1.41 0.93 1.60* 0.94
Average price (Mil. VND/ Ton) 5.55* 3.30 7.07*** 2.70 5.23* 3.15 5.36* 3.08
Input costs (Mil. VND) 2.96 2.52 5.06* 2.63 1.86 2.03 3.49* 2.01
Labor costs (Mil. VND) 7.40*** 2.85 8.65*** 2.78 6.36** 2.59 7.52** 2.72
Net income (Mil. VND) 42.87** 19.86 41.07** 19.90 30.29 19.23 38.44** 19.18
70 matches 69 matches 72 matches 74 matches
Table 4.2: ATET results using mean statistics: Certified non-coop members vs. Con-
trol households
First, certification improves farmers’ sales value, primarily because it results in a higher
price for their tea products. In particular, sales value increases significantly by approxi-
mately, and the magnitude of the impact varies across models - from around 40 to 55 mil-
lion VND (equivalent to an increase of 28 - 46 percent compared to the matched control
group). Fresh production and tea farm size both have insignificant impacts. Although
there is an increase in productivity, it fluctuates across models and is only marginally
significant in model 4. By contrast, I find fairly consistent evidence of a higher price
for certified farmers. The average price is significantly improved by approximately 5–7
million VND per ton, equal to a 16 - 23 percent increment.
In addition, certified farmers can obtain higher net incomes, despite an increase in pro-
duction costs. Expenses for fertilizers, pesticides and other materials do not differ sig-
nificantly for the treated side. However, certification leads to a significant increase in
hired labor expenses of approximately 6–9 million VND. Lastly, I find a positive effect of
certification on net income from tea farms. This effect is significant and fairly consistent
in its magnitude of around 40 million VND in model 1,2 and 4 – equal to a 40 percent
increase compared to the matched control group. However, it falls to about 30 million
VND and becomes insignificant in model 3.
The small sample size and potential outliers in the outcome variable make the results,
particularly those of the statistical test, differ somewhat across models Thus, to further
check the consistency of the results, I additionally report ATETs using rank statistics in
Table 4.3. Using rank outcome variables, certification shows much more clear trends of
its impacts. Positive impacts on sales value, average price, labor costs and net income
display a high degree of consistency Whereas, ATETs for the rest outcome variables are
insignificant in almost all models.
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1
A caliper of 0.01 is applied for one nearest neighbor matching based on propensity score.
Model 3 and 4 restrict control farmers to communes where the treatment is available.
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E.
Sales value 57.30** 24.79 65.10*** 25.01 56.69** 23.94 69.78** 24.57
Fresh production 24.11 22.35 40.64* 23.91 32.90 24.58 46.29 26.22
Tea farm size 10.44 21.58 29.84 21.90 -1.78 22.67 -1.40 20.56
Productivity 17.66 27.31 0.70 28.07 42.79 27.96 50.88 28.70
Average price 88.03*** 29.81 84.94*** 28.47 70.75** 29.88 69.49** 28.88
Input costs 37.57 23.82 61.94** 25.83 33.68 23.49 43.95 24.68
Labor costs 64.86** 25.73 76.51*** 28.56 61.55** 26.76 70.07** 25.76
Net income 52.91** 26.01 54.77** 25.34 50.06** 25.09 62.13** 25.44
70 matches 69 matches 72 matches 74 matches
Table 4.3: ATET results using rank statistics: Certified non-coop members vs. Con-
trol households
4.3.2 Impacts of certified cooperatives
ATETs of certified cooperative using mean statistics and rank statistics are indicated
in Table 4.4 and 4.5 respectively In total, there are 7 models satisfying the balancing
criteria. Balance checking for the 7 models are displayed in Table A.4 in Appendix A.
Overall, the results are similar to those of certification groups. However, I can see wider
fluctuations in the estimated ATETs, typically in the analysis using mean statistics.
A caliper of 0.01 is applied for one nearest neighbor matching based on propensity score.
Model 4 to 7 restrict control farmers to communes where the treatment is available.
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E.
Sales value (Mil. VND) 42.93** 20.54 35.97 23.32 51.39** 21.99 56.98* 29.81 48.41 0.13 39.57* 21.94 38.68** 19.12
Fresh production (Ton) 0.55* 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.71** 0.32 0.79** 0.35 0.52 0.16 0.54 0.33 0.53* 0.30
Tea farm size (ha) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.36 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.05
Productivity  (Ton/ha) 0.86 1.17 0.16 1.20 1.79* 1.08 2.24** 1.03 0.86 0.48 1.59 0.98 2.25** 0.92
Average price (Mil./ Ton) 7.40*** 2.70 8.33*** 2.28 7.31*** 3.10 8.94** 4.51 7.52** 0.06 7.31** 3.14 6.71** 3.10
Input costs (Mil. VND) 3.61 2.21 2.58 2.44 3.27 2.35 2.13 2.55 0.92 0.70 1.33 2.55 0.92 2.49
Labor costs (Mil. VND) 6.71** 2.83 7.63** 3.07 8.17** 3.22 5.66* 3.16 6.17* 0.08 7.15** 2.92 6.73** 2.83
Net income (Mil. VND) 32.61* 18.37 25.77 20.91 39.95** 19.61 49.19* 26.88 41.32 0.15 31.09 19.18 31.04* 16.36
54 matches 53 matches 52 matches 55 matches 56 matches 53 matches 53 matches
Table 4.4: ATET results using mean statistics: Certified coop members vs. Control
households
In detail, according to Table 4.4, certified coop members receive higher sales value, but
the impacts are not consistent and insignificant in model 2 and model 5 Fresh production
and productivity have significant ATETs in some models, while farm size has ATETs
close to zero. The average price has a high consistency of significantly positive ATETs
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A caliper of 0.01 is applied for one nearest neighbor matching based on propensity score.
Model 4 to 7 restrict control farmers to communes where the treatment is available.
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E.
Sales value
82.17*** 29.11 61.57***29.22 84.16** 28.99 97.05***31.47 67.75** 31.67 70.81** 31.52 71.51** 25.28
Fresh production
49.32* 27.48 25.27 29.10 58.58** 27.47 69.08** 29.83 44.63 28.60 42.97 28.75 47.19* 24.80
Tea farm size
17.05 26.35 6.65 27.22 8.26 26.79 7.52 30.61 10.24 25.54 -4.21 28.80 -16.69 28.98
Productivity 52.90* 30.56 29.03 31.96 65.88** 30.89 84.47***30.32 55.59* 31.32 47.51 30.15 80.17** 28.89
Average price 88.88***25.54 101.00***22.02 101.78***24.31 108.00***27.47 87.32***27.87 97.40***25.95 103.00***23.73
Input costs 24.70 27.00 13.47 31.49 22.96 28.13 13.35 31.71 -0.57 30.80 2.14 28.88 1.46 29.85
Labor costs 32.72 28.73 33.82 27.79 39.64 32.49 34.31 33.07 45.17 31.61 27.86 30.18 27.50 24.90
Net income 80.56***28.45 59.82***28.47 83.70** 28.76 102.90***30.64 77.76***31.37 69.56** 31.78 74.33***23.73
54 matches 53 matches 52 matches 55 matches 56 matches 53 matches 53 matches
Table 4.5: ATET results using rank statistics: Certified coop members vs. Control
households
of approximately across the 7 models. There no significant impacts on input costs, while
labor cost significantly increases The impact on net income, although being positive,
shows a low level of statistical significance in most models.
In Table 4.5, similar impacts as with certification groups after rank transformation can be
seen. Sales value, average price and net income all have positive and significant ATETs
across 7 models. However, I cannot find any significant ATETs for labor costs, which is
possibly due to there are too many zero values in this subgroup analysis. The table also
shows significant impacts on fresh production and productivity, although they are not
consistent throughout models.
In summary, as with certification groups, this study finds similar positive impacts of cer-
tified cooperatives on sales value, selling price, and net farm income. The impacts should
however be attributed to both collective marketing via the cooperatives and voluntary
certification. Note that the ATETs of the two treatments are not directly compara-
ble. The ATET estimation considers only the counterfactual for the treated group. As
indicated in Table A.5 in Appendix A, because there are significant differences in the
observed covariates between the two treatment groups (i.e., certified coop members and
certified non-coop members), different samples of control households are used to con-
struct the counterfactual. In other words, ATETs for the two treatments are estimated
from two samples with significant differences in their background characteristics. Given
one outcome variable, a direct comparison of the ATET between the two treatments does
not correct for these background differences and therefore might suffer from biases.
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4.4 Discussion
Unlike the results of the marketing cooperative in chapter 3, this study can find evident
impacts of certification programs. In detail, there are positive effects on selling price,
sales and net income. This is consistent with findings from studies that examine export
crops in other countries (e.g., Arnould et al., 2009; Subervie and Vagneron, 2013; Valkila
and Nygren, 2010; Vellema et al., 2015). Although comparisons are hard to draw, the
magnitude of the positive impact on net income – about a 40 percent increase – might
be smaller than findings from other studies. For instance, Subervie and Vagneron (2013)
found that GlobalGAP certification led to an increment of more than 60 percent in sold
quantity for lychee farmers in Madagascar. Certification also doubled net income from
raspberry production in Chile (Handschuch et al., 2013).
Compared to membership of non-certified cooperatives – the treatment in chapter 3,
membership of certification groups has more favorable conditions for clear economic
impacts. First, the issue of inactive participation is less likely. There are no certification
groups that only existed on the paper without any practical activities. To obtain the
group certification, members were required to actively participate in the training and
monitoring process.
Second, impacts of marketing cooperatives are subject to sub-components of membership
as well as leader-related characteristics. As explained in chapter 3, those characteristics
often differ across cooperatives. By contrast, components of the certification system were
fairly constant across groups. The majority of certified farmers - 113 out of 147 - were
following VietGAP standards with the similar implementation of the scheme 1. Group
leaders played mostly managing role rather than decided the group effectiveness, as it
is the case in marketing cooperative. Because of the two above reasons, this study can
obtain significant ATET estimates of certification.
I explore interpretation for important effects of the voluntary certification. Positive im-
pacts on selling price and farm sales could be resulted from higher penetration into high-
value markets of certified tea products. Rapid economic development and urbanization
are shifting domestic shoppers towards supermarkets, which emphasize the importance
of public and private standards (Wertheim-Heck and Spaargaren, 2016; Wertheim-Heck
et al., 2015; Fuchs et al., 2011). Such requirements from retailers consequently drive
changes upstream in the value chain. Wholesale traders and private companies that
supply supermarkets may have a higher demand for tea from certified farms. In addi-
tion, certified cooperatives might even have capabilities for engaging in direct supply to
1 The rest 34 UTZ certified farmers are in certified coop members, for whom I could not isolate
impacts of voluntary certification from collective marketing.
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modern retailers (Moustier et al., 2010). The high potential for penetration into mod-
ern, lucrative markets results in certified farms experiencing higher selling prices and
subsequently better farm sales.
Certified farmers may also increase their production of high-quality tea with more strin-
gently selected fresh materials, leading to higher selling prices and sales value, Consumers’
preference for certified products is income elastic (Mergenthaler et al., 2009a). Farmers
may therefore produce high-quality tea products, which target high-income consumers,
more intensively.
The higher costs of hired labor are possibly the result of additional labor needs among
certified producers. In the context of specialty green tea production, households typ-
ically hire labor for harvesting fresh tea (70 percent of hired labor costs, on average),
although neighboring farmers commonly exchange labor with each other during harvest
periods. Because of the requirements of the standards (e.g., restrictions on the use of
agro-chemicals), the management of certified tea farms is usually more labor intensive
than that of non-certified tea farms. Therefore, certified farmers may have less time for
labor exchange, which consequently raises the costs of harvesting on their own farm. In
addition, the adoption of certification programs could induce farmers to produce spe-
cialty tea of high quality, which requires a more selective harvest of fresh leaves and
intensive family labor during the processing stage. Hence, significant additional hired
labor for the harvest is needed.
4.5 Conclusions
This study analyzes original data on 401 green tea producers in Thai Nguyen to evaluate
the impacts of voluntary certification on farm economic indicators. PSM is again applied
to estimate ATETs. I carefully check for the balance in the observed covariates after
matching to mitigate selection bias.
The results indicate that smallholder tea farmers are able to obtain a higher average
selling price by participating in voluntary certification programs. The impact on pro-
duction is unclear, and farm size and yield exhibit no significant effects. Certified farmers
have a significantly higher sales value, primarily owing to the better price they obtain.
Input costs are insignificantly affected, while hired labors costs rise sharply. Finally,
certification significantly increases the adopters’ net farm income. The analyses, where
treatment is certified cooperative, yield results consistent with the baseline analysis.
Thus, the findings could first lend evidence-based support to the implementation of
voluntary certification standards for specialty green tea production. Although the vast
Impacts of voluntary certification on small-scale farm income 44
majority of this product is currently consumed in domestic markets, where there are less-
favorable conditions regarding the benefits of food quality and safety standards, small-
scale farmers can still receive positive impacts on price, sales and net income. In addition,
the positive impacts of certification programs on hired labor costs may potentially imply
an employment effect at the local level. Nonetheless, because the demand for hired labor
(mainly for harvesting) is quite infrequent and clustered among groups of neighbors, this
job-creation effect might be small.
The certified non-coop members include only VietGAP certified farmers. The positive
results for the impacts of certification on non-coop farmers suggest that the adoption
of VietGAP, a set of domestic voluntary standards, also contributes to better tea farm
performance. Hence, the results could support the current Vietnamese government’s
promotion of VietGAP for specialty green tea production. The adoption of the domestic
standards may also serve as preparation for tea farmers to achieve stricter international
standards in the future when links to export markets are strengthened.
The results in this chapter have some limitations. Primarily, the matching procedure
might not eliminate bias caused by the unobserved covariates. As I could not verify
whether those variables become well balanced after matching, the ATET estimator might
be vulnerable to self-selection bias. However, I took several steps to ensure the reliability
of the findings. I cautiously tested the sensitivity of the estimates using different Probit
models. Strong consistency in the results was observed across models.
Moreover, to rigorously check the consistency of the findings, I rely on the coarsened
exact matching (CEM) method (Iacus et al., 2012). The CEM method has desirable
statistical properties, namely, imbalance bounding and non-violation of the congruence
principle, which allow it to generate robust and less-biased inferences. CEM results for
the full sample analysis, reported in Table A.6 in Appendix A, are generally consistent
with the previous PSM estimators 2.
Finally, the ATET estimator for net income does not exactly reflect the additional profit
from certification. There are costs associated with certification (e.g., certification fee and
opportunity costs from additional household labor on tea farms) that are not considered
in the results. Thus, the net gain from certification could be smaller than the estimated
effect on net income.
2 In this analysis, I pool certified non-coop members and certified coop members into one treatment
group. This aggregation is necessary because the sample size is too small for each treatment group. With
many observations excluded after coarsened matching, I cannot have enough power for the statistical
tests of the estimated impacts (after matching, the sample sizes of certified non-coop members and
certified coop members are 23 and 25, respectively).
Chapter 5
Farmers’ Preferences of Certification
Schemes: A Randomized Conjoint
Analysis
5.1 Introduction
Voluntary certification for small-scale farms undergoes gradual development in Vietnam.
With support from the government and NGOs, farmer groups under various certifica-
tion schemes have been established nationwide. Among different schemes, VietGAP, a
domestic agricultural certificate, is the most familiar to Vietnamese small-scale farmers.
Although the protocol of VietGAP is regulated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development, the certification is voluntary and issued to farmer groups by third-party
entities 1. Since the first implementation in 2008, VietGAP has been actively promoted
for various agricultural products, from crops to fisheries and animal husbandry. The
outreach of the program is nonetheless rather limited. For instance, among about 34,000
registered agricultural farms in 2017, only 1900, equivalent to around 5.5 percent, are
VietGAP certified. Surprisingly, the certified planted area for tea is merely 3 percent,
although tea is a focused commodity of VietGAP 2. Thus, measures to improve the
participation of smallholder farmers in VietGAP are highly necessary.
Although how to attract small-scale farmers to certification programs is often of great
interest, there is a shortage of studies examining this issue. The most significant body
of literature evaluated the socio-economic and environmental impacts of certification
1 The third parties are either state agencies or private companies.
2 The statistics were collected from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the
Vietnam General Statistic Office and computed by the author.
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schemes (see DeFries et al. (2017) and Oya et al. (2018) for reviews). There are some
studies exploring factors, mainly farm, household and contextual characteristics, cor-
related with the participation decision (Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Handschuch et al.,
2013, e.g.,). Because causal interpretations are hardly be inferred from those correlation
findings, policy implications are often limited.
Farmers’ preference of design attributes of certification schemes plays a crucial role in
participation decision. Perceived costs and benefits from the design attributes are com-
ponents of utility gained from a certification scheme, subsequently allowing farmers to
decide whether the program is viable and beneficial. The significance of design attributes
has been examined for institutional arrangements involving smallholder farmers, such as
contract farming (Abebe et al., 2013; Schipmann and Qaim, 2011), supermarket contracts
(Ochieng et al., 2017) and soil conservation (Marenya et al., 2014). Similar studies for
certification are scarce.
Meemken et al. (2017) is the only study explicitly tests the impacts of design attributes on
farmers’ participation in certification programs. Nonetheless, as with the above studies,
Meemken et al. (2017) employed a conventional choice experiment with d-optimal design.
As mentioned in chapter 2, the causal impacts of the attributes can hardly be estimated
in this design.
Thus, to address this gap in the literature on voluntary certification standards, the case
study in this chapter applies the new RCA design (Hainmueller et al., 2014) to eval-
uate causal effects of design attributes on farmer participation. The case study was
still conducted in green tea production area in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. In the random-
ized conjoint experiment, small-scale green tea farmers were asked to choose whether
to engage in hypothetical VietGAP programs. The active development of certification
programs for small tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, as mentioned in Chapter 2, offers a
contextual validity for the choice experiment.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Description of the study sites, methods for
data sampling, choice experiment procedure and data analysis are explained in detailed
in section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents results from the randomized conjoint analyses. A
discussion of the results is provided in section 5.4, and section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Study site and sampling method
a. Study site
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Sources: 
http://www.bandovn.vn
http://thainguyen.gov.vn
http://daitu.thainguyen.gov.vn
Figure 5.1: Study sites in Dai Tu district, Thai Nguyen province, Vietnam
This study is based on a randomized conjoint experiment on Vietnamese small-scale
green tea farmers conducted in Thai Nguyen province in July 2018. As aforementioned
in chapter 3, certification standards, such as VietGAP, are increasingly familiar among
small-scale tea farmers in Vietnam. This case study, hence, is highly suitable for shedding
light on farmers’ preferences for the certification programs. Thai Nguyen is again chosen
due to the large tea production area and a high density of VietGAP certified tea groups.
However, this study only sampled households in one district named Dai Tu, rather than
spread the sample throughout the province as in chapter 3 and chapter 4. A detailed
map of the study sites is shown in Figure 5.1. Dai Tu district, accounting for about 30
percent of Thai Nguyen’s planted tea area, owns the largest green tea farming area in the
province. In December 2017, 16 VietGAP groups were newly established in the district,
owing to subsidy for certification fee from the local government. In total, Dai Tu has
20 VietGAP groups, the largest number of VietGAP groups in Thai Nguyen. Given the
high exposure of local farmers to the VietGAP programs, the district is an ideal study
site.
b. Sampling method
This study is a part of a project with three objectives: (i) evaluating the impacts of infor-
mation provision and subsidy on farmers’ adoption of organic fertilizer by a randomized
control trial (RCT), (ii) eliciting farmers’ preference for the design of VietGAP certifica-
tion programs by a randomized conjoint experiment, (iii) evaluating the socio-economic
impacts of VietGAP on small-scale farmers. The randomized conjoint experiment was
conducted in a sub-sample of the project’s full sample.
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Regarding data collection for the whole project, this study followed a two-step procedure,
village sampling and household sampling, to obtain data of 1287 tea-farming households.
In the first step, 9 communes were selected, as demonstrated in Figure 5.1, in Dai Tu
district which had newly established VietGAP groups in December 2017 3. In each com-
mune, I chose all villages with active VietGAP groups and their neighboring villages
without active VietGAP groups 4. In total, 30 villages were selected: four for a pilot
survey and 26 for the main survey. In the second step, tea-farming households were
randomly selected using villager lists and VietGAP member lists provided by local of-
ficers. In each village, the survey team visited 45 households during the main survey
and 36 households during the pilot survey 5. In villages with an active VietGAP group
(hereafter, VietGAP villages), the survey included all VietGAP members group due to
their relatively small numbers. The remaining households, if any, were randomly se-
lected from the VietGAP non-members. In villages without an active VietGAP group
(hereafter non-VietGAP villages), 45 tea-farming households were selected.
Based on the list of 1287 households for the whole project, I further selected a sub-
sample of 750 households to conduct the randomized conjoint experiment on 6. Due to
the small number of the VietGAP members, compared to the non-members, I prioritized
the sampling of the former whenever possible. In detail, in VietGAP village, I randomly
chose 35 VietGAP members from the member lists if possible. If the certified group size
was less than or equal to 35, all members joint the choice experiment. Further, I selected
around 40 percent of the VietGAP non-members on the project list in both VietGAP and
non-VietGAP villages. As a result, I chose 750 households for the randomized conjoint
experiment. Among which, 301 was VietGAP members and 449 was non-members.
All selected households, regardless of their participation in the conjoint experiment, was
home-visited by the investigators 7. The household representatives must be family mem-
bers who regularly made main decisions regarding tea farm production. If the household
3 The purpose of this commune selection is to collect farm information before the intervention,
which is fundamental for the third objective of the project. I initially chose 10 communes, but only
got permission to conduct the project in 9 communes indicated by black location marks in Figure 4.1
(namely, Binh Thuan, Tien Hoi, Khoi Ky, Phu Xuyen, Van Yen, My Yen, Phu Cuong, Hoang Nong and
La Bang).
4 In Hoang Nong Commune, I conducted the experiment and survey only in villages with VietGAP
tea groups following a request from the local government.
5 The number of sampled households in each village was not always as planned due to availability of
the selected households or the insufficient number of tea farming households in that village.
6 I did not conduct the conjoint experiment on the whole project sample because of resource con-
straint. One important constraint was that in each village the survey must be finished within one day.
This was to prevent information spillover, a requirement of the RCT.
7 12 investigators who were students and staff in the Thai Nguyen University of Agriculture and
Forestry get engaged in the survey. In a two-day training, they were carefully instructed about how
to carry out the RCT, the conjoint experiment and household survey using a smartphone-based ques-
tionnaire. Before the main survey, a pilot survey was conducted in 4 villages when the investigators
were practically trained. The investigators were always divided into two teams of six. The two teams
operated in two neighboring villages simultaneously on a single day.
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representatives were not available during the visiting day, alternative households, which
were prepared in advance on the list, was selected as substitutes 8.
5.2.2 Randomized conjoint analysis
a. Selection of design attributes
A certification scheme is a package of requirements and benefits. Changes in those
attributes might significantly improve (or hinder) the uptake of the program. This study
purposively selected five attributes of the certification program and tested their impacts
on the participation of the small-scale tea farmers. Table 5.1 shows a list of chosen
attributes and their definitions. Levels of each attribute are demonstrated in Table 5.2,
where the Level 1 – the baseline level – corresponds the status quo of current VietGAP
program in the study sites. This section justifies the choice of the five attributes.
1
No. Attributes Explanation
1 Certification fee Fee for a two-year certification period (VND/Sao or VND/ha)
2 Record keeping Whether keeping record of purchasing and using input materials, harvest and sales ismandatory or not
3 Application of organic fertilizer A requirement for applying bio-compost on tea farm
4 Free shipping for organic fertilizer
Whether household have free shipping of bio-compost or not for their VietGAP group
purchase
5 Delayed payment for organic fertilizer 
How many days household can delay payment of bio-compost for their VietGAP group
purchase
Table 5.1: Definitions of selected attributes
1
No. Attributes Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5
1 Certification fee
0 VND 36,000 /Sao
(VND 1 Mil./Ha) 
VND 72,000 /Sao
(VND 2 Mil./Ha) 
VND 144,000 /Sao
(VND 4 Mil./Ha) 
VND 288,000 /Sao
(VND 8 Mil./Ha) 
2 Record keeping Mandatory No
3 Application of organic fertilizer
Not mandatory
Harvest-based 
with chemical 
fertilizers combinable
Only organic fertilizer 
allowed
4 Free shipping for organic fertilizer
No Yes
5 Delayed payment for organic fertilizer
No 30 days 60 days
Table 5.2: Levels of selected attributes
8 The lists of alternative households included non-selected households in the village were sorted
randomly.
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The first attribute is certification fee. Payments from the farmers are necessary to cover a
third-party’s costs such as initial farm inspection, training and monitoring. An increase
in the fee obviously reduces the outreach of the scheme. However, very few studies
investigated the sensitivity of small farmers to this very tangible costs. Such negligence
could be due to the fact that the certification fee is heavily subsidized by NGOs or
governments in many cases. The certification costs of the active VietGAP groups in the
study sites were also fully supported by the local government. Nonetheless, it is still
crucial to examine how farmers react to different fee levels so as to design better subsidy
and fee-sharing programs.
The second attribute is a requirement of record keeping. Documentation of used inputs,
harvests and sales is a foundation for traceability of the certified products, which in turn
might improve consumers’ trust in the labels. In addition, farmers may believe that
record-keeping is conducive to the effective management of their production. Meemken
et al. (2017) indeed found a positive effect of record-keeping on the participation rate.
However, keeping a sufficient and credible record is notoriously challenging, even for
highly educated farmers. Hence, the impact of this attribute remains ambiguous.
The next three are hypothetical attributes related to organic fertilizer. Soil degradation
due to the overuse of chemical fertilizer is prevalent in tea and other crops farming in
Vietnam (Nguyen, 2017). Combination of organic fertilizer with the chemical one is
recommended to mitigate the environmental damage caused by the latter and sustain
soil fertility (Duan et al., 2016; Ji et al., 2018). Sustainability certification scheme
has a potential role to play in escalating the proper utilization of fertilizer 9. Hence, I
additionally included new hypothetical attributes related to the application and purchase
of organic fertilizer. The first is a requirement of application organic fertilizer. I specified
three levels as shown in Table 5.2. The second level is a usual recommendation from
producers of organic fertilizer, while the third one is an extreme case where farmers can
only use organic fertilizers for tea farming. The other two are benefits that farmers
can obtain when purchasing organic fertilizers from their certification group, namely free
shipping and delayed payment. Although those services are rarely provided in reality,
there are rooms for the incorporation. Certification always relies on the establishment
of farmer organizations (FOs). Hence, in addition to quality assurance, the FOs can
introduce services related input purchases to make the best use of their collective action
(Poulton et al., 2010). I expect that those new services attract more farmers into the
certification program.
9 International certification schemes, such as GlobalGAP and UTZ, have stringent guidelines for the
application of fertilizers. In its official document, VietGAP also recommends farmers to limit the use of
chemical fertilizer while increase using organic fertilizer.
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Lastly, although it is not included in Table 5.1 and 5.2, I also test the impact of price
premium on farmers’ participation. The price premium is the most tangible benefits for
farmers to join an agricultural institution. Hence, the elasticity of farmers to premium
levels is often examined in literature (Meemken et al., 2017; Ochieng et al., 2017). I
specified 5 levels of premium per 1 kilogram of certified dried tea: 0 VND; 5,000 VND;
10,000 VND; 20,000 VND; 40,000 VND. Those levels are decided based on the results
of the previous studies about the impacts of the certification on tea selling price. It is
noteworthy that the premium levels were not randomized at choice task level but at the
respondent level. The premium levels were assigned randomly to respondent joining the
choice experiment and were fixed across all choice tasks of a respondent. As such, the
price premium could be regarded a scenario treatment for the choice experiment 10.
b. Experiment procedure
750 households joining in the randomized conjoint experiment follow a three-step proce-
dure:
(1) an RCT on household purchase of organic fertilizer,
(2) a randomized conjoint experiment on preference for hypothetical VietGAP scheme,
(3) a questionnaire-based interview for information on household tea production and
other income sources in 2017.
Elaboration of the RCT step is skipped because it is out of the scope of this study. In
brief, households were assigned randomly to three groups: the control group, informa-
tion treatment group and subsidy group. The outcome of interest is the respondents’
immediate decision on purchasing an organic fertilizer product offered by the project.
After this decision-making, they continue to the randomized conjoint experiment.
This study constructed a scenario where one household decides whether to join hypo-
thetical VietGAP programs. First, to maintain the respondent’s full understanding of
VietGAP, the investigators briefly introduced the purpose and main requirements of Vi-
etGAP 11. The respondent was then asked: “If there are hypothetical VietGAP programs
with following features, we would like to know whether your household want to join the
programs or not”. The choice tasks, as an example is shown in Figure 5.2, were presented.
10 Certification fee and price premium are both pecuniary attributes. If both of them are randomly
assigned at the choice task level, the respondents might get confused easily. Therefore, I randomized
certification fee at the choice task level, while the premium was randomized at the household level and
remained unchanged across all choice tasks of a household. Before each choice task, the investigators
were required to mention the price premium again.
11 In all selected communes, there were active VietGAP groups, and VietGAP training was also
conducted by local officers. Hence, the respondents usually had a decent knowledge of the program.
Before the introduction, the investigators confirmed whether a household was a member of any current
active VietGAP group. The non-members were given a more detailed introduction of the program.
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Choice Code Choice Code
177 53
 C
1 Delayed payment for 
organic fertilizer 60 days 30 days
2 Certification fee VND 288,000/ Sao(VND 8 Mil./ha)
VND 36,000/ Sao
(VND 1 Mil./ha)
3 Record keeping No Mandatory
4 Application of organic 
fertilizer
Only organic fertilizer 
allowed
Only organic fertilizer 
allowed
5 Free shipping for organic 
fertilizer No Yes
Lần 3 Choice Code Choice Code
160 179
Not to join 
VietGAP
A B C
A B C
Figure 5.2: An example of a choice task
Each choice task contained 3 alternatives: A and B were to join hypothetical VietGAP
programs with corresponding attributes, while C meant not to join the program. The
investigators explained thoroughly the meaning of each attribute in alternative A and
B. Importantly, hypothetical levels of the price premium for participation in VietGAP
programs were introduced. If the respondent chose either A or B, their certified tea
would be purchased at the market unit price of the non-certified tea plus the premium.
In every choice task, levels of the five attributes in alternative A and B were fully random-
ized following Hainmueller et al. (2014). Order of the attributes was also randomized by
households to eliminate any ordering effects. However, for one household, price premium
level was fixed across all choice tasks.
After confirming the respondent’s complete understanding of the scenario, the investiga-
tors asked him/her to rank the three options. The investigators first asked the respondent
to name the alternative s/he liked the most, which is numbered 1. After that, among the
rest two options, the respondent was asked to choose which s/he preferred, numbered 2.
The rest option was numbered 3. Each respondent had to finish 5 choice tasks.
5.2.3 Data analysis
Based on the regression procedure in chapter 2, AMCEs of all attributes are estimated.
Because there are three alternatives in total in each choice task, there are two choice
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results. In external choice, the choice outcome takes on the value 1 (Yijk = 1) if a
hypothetical VietGAP program (alternative A or B) is preferred to no-participation
(alternative C), and 0 otherwise. In internal choice, Yijk = 1 if a hypothetical VietGAP
program is preferred to the other VietGAP alternative in the same choice task, and 0
otherwise. Since the main objective is to examine how the design attributes affect the
participation in VietGAP programs, this section only reports results of external choice.
Results for internal choice are shown in Appendix B.
In addition to design attributes, this study also estimates the impacts of the price pre-
mium on the choice outcome. Because the levels of the price premium is a random
scenario for all choice tasks, their impact on the choice probability of VietGAP can be
estimated by a similar linear regression. Standard errors of these estimators are also
clustered by respondents as the premium levels are randomly assigned at the respon-
dent level. I then compare the impacts of price premium and that of the certification fee.
The former implies for farmers’ willingness-to-accept (WTA) of a VietGAP program; the
later reflects their willingness-to-pay (WTP). Although estimation of WTP and WTA is
beyond the scope of this study, I quantitatively test the difference in the impacts of the
two pecuniary features.
Finally, this study estimates conditional AMCEs see heterogeneity in the impacts of
the attributes. In detail, I first estimate AMCEs conditional of VietGAP membership.
VietGAP members and non-members are different in their experience of the certification
program as well as other background characteristics. Hence, it is compelling to investigate
if there are differences in the preferences between the two groups. Further, because the
randomized conjoint experiment was conducted after the RCT in the first step, one may
concern that AMCEs estimators are affected by the treatments of the RCT. The two
treatments, 50% subsidy and information, are designed to support the trial purchase of
an organic fertilizer product. They therefore might affect treated farmers’ preferences
of attributes related to organic fertilizer. AMCEs conditional on RCT treatments are
estimated to investigate such interaction.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 5.3 indicates mean comparisons in household characteristics between the collected
sample for this study and that of chapter 3 and 4. First, there are some statistically
significant differences in demographic variables. Households in the new sample have a
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* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Variable
Survey 2018 Survey 2017
Mean diference(n = 745) (n = 476)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.E.
Subsidy dummy 0.34 0.48
Information dummy 0.34 0.48
Current VietGAP member dummy 0.40 0.49
Age of the respondent 47.03 10.74
Education level of the respondent (years) 7.52 2.32
Female respondent dummy 0.49 0.50
Head dummy 0.56 0.50
Distance to the nearest market (km) 1.89 1.20 2.02 1.27 -0.13* 0.07
Family size 3.84 1.37 4.06 1.30 -0.22*** 0.08
Age of the household head 49.99 10.90 49.07 11.00 0.93 0.64
Education level of the household head (years) 7.18 2.36 7.42 2.46 -0.24* 0.14
Female-headed dummy 0.12 0.33 0.19 0.39 -0.06*** 0.02
Annual cropland holding (ha) 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 -0.01 0.01
Perennial cropland holding (ha) 0.35 0.27 0.36 0.25 0.00 0.02
Tea farm size (ha) 0.33 0.24 0.34 0.23 -0.01 0.01
Motorbike ratio 0.51 0.30 0.55 0.27 -0.05*** 0.02
Computer dummy 0.10 0.30 0.28 0.45 -0.18*** 0.02
Car dummy 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.22 -0.02*** 0.01
Table 5.3: Mean difference in household characteristics of the two samples
slightly smaller size and are less likely to be female-headed. Differences in the education
level of household head and market distance are only marginally significant.
Second, land holdings are very similar between the two samples, while asset holdings
reveal considerable differences. Households in the recent data are worse off regarding
all indicators of asset holdings, including motorbike ratio, computer dummy, and car
dummy. This is reasonable since Dai Tu is an economically disadvantaged district in
Thai Nguyen province.
Due to the above differences, the sample might not well represent the population of
smallholder tea farmers in Thai Nguyen province but are more specific to tea farmers in
Dai Tu district.
5.3.2 AMCEs of certification attributes
Results of AMCEs for the external choice analyses are illustrated in Figure 5.3 12. Specif-
ically, the certification fee has a strong and negative effect on VietGAP participation.
An increase in the fee from zero to 1 million/ ha reduce joining likelihood by nearly
7 percentage points on average (p < 0.01). From that level, every doubling of the fee
additionally leads to an average drop of around 6 percentage points in the choice prob-
ability of the VietGAP program (p < 0.01). Removal of mandatory record keeping has
an insignificant impact on joining VietGAP, which indicates record keeping does not
necessarily prevent smallholder farmers from producing certified products
12 Values of estimated coefficients are shown in table B.1 in the Appendix
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VND 0
VND 1 Mil
VND 2 Mil
VND 4 Mil
VND 8 Mil
Mandatory
No
Not mandatory
Harvest-based (chemical combinable)
Only organic fertilizer
No
Yes
No
30 days
60 days
 Certification fee
 Record keeping
 Organic fertilizer application
 Free shipping for organic fertilizer
 Delayed payment for organic fertilizer
-.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1
Figure 5.3: AMCEs for external choice
In addition, attributes related to organic fertilizer reveal statistically significant effects on
VietGAP choice. Although harvest-based application combined with chemical fertilizer
does not lead to any significant changes in the external choice, it has a marginally positive
impact of about 2.5 percentage points in the internal choice (p < 0.1). By contrast, the
extreme requirement of only using organic fertilizer for tea farming strongly reduces the
choice likelihood of VietGAP by 15 percentage points or so (p < 0.01). Moreover, free
shipping for organic fertilizer purchased through VietGAP groups does not significantly
make VietGAP more attractive than the opt-out. Whereas, delayed payment options do
have a positive impact of around 3.5 percentage points (p < 0.05).
Figure 5.4 demonstrates a comparison between the impact of the certification fee and
that of the price premium on external choice. The average productivity of tea farmers in
the sample is approximately 1.8 dried ton/ha/year 13. Therefore, a minimum premium
of 5,000 VND/ dried kg would be more than enough to cover a fee of 8 Million/ ha over
a 2-year period of the certificate. However, insignificant impacts of the price premium
levels can be seen from the figure. Only when the premium rises to 40,000 VND/ dried
kg that it has a positive impact of about 8 percentage points (p < 0.05). Meanwhile, as
explained above, farmers’ choice of VietGAP is highly sensitive to increases in VietGAP
fee. A fee level of 8 Million VND/ha reduces participation probability by nearly 26
percent (p < 0.01). Thus, the results highlight a considerable gap between the impacts
of the two pecuniary attributes.
13 This is roughly equivalent to fresh productivity of 9 ton/ha since it usually takes 5 kg of fresh tea
to produce 1 kg of dried one.
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VND 0
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VND 8 Mil
 Price premium (VND/dried kg)
 Certification fee (VND/ha)
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Figure 5.4: External AMCEs: Price premium vs. Certification fee
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Figure 5.5: Conditional AMCEs on VietGAP membership
5.3.3 Conditional AMCEs
External AMCEs of the certification attributes conditional on VietGAP membership are
indicated in Figure 5.5. Overall, impacts are almost similar between the two groups.
The only significant difference is in the impact of delayed payment for organic fertilizer
purchased through VietGAP group. For the current VietGAP members, impacts of 30-
day and 60-day delays are close to zero. Meanwhile, for the nonmembers, both levels
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Figure 5.6: Conditional AMCEs on RCT treatments
show positive impacts of 6 and 5 percentage points respectively. I also ran a regression
model incorporating interaction terms between levels of delayed payment and VietGAP
membership to confirm the statistical significance of the differences. Results of the
regression model are shown in Table B.2 in Appendix B.
Lastly, Figure 5.6 describes AMCEs conditional on RCT treatment status for external
choice. The requirement of applying organic fertilizer is the attribute which shows sig-
nificant interactions with the RCT treatments. The direction of the interaction effects
however contradicts the expectation. Since RCT treatments increase the order of the
organic fertilizers 14, I anticipated them to have positive interactions with the VietGAP
requirement of applying organic fertilizer. Nonetheless, while harvest-based application
increases the choice of VietGAP by about 7 percentage points in the control group, its
positive impact significantly diminishes and becomes indifferent from zero in both sub-
sidy and information treatment groups. Likewise, compared to the control group, sole
application organic of fertilizer has a more negative impact on VietGAP participation in
the two treatment groups 15.
14 I confirmed the positive impacts of both RCT treatments on the order probability and order amount
of the organic fertilizer using statistical tests and regression models.
15 Significant and negative coefficients of the interaction terms with harvest-based application, shown
in Table B.3 in the Appendix, are found for both subsidy treatment (p < 0.05) and information treatment
(p < 0.1) The negative interaction term between only-organic-fertilizer and information treatment is also
statically significant (p < 0.01).
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5.4 Discussion
The results show significant impacts of the selected attributes on VietGAP participa-
tion. This section discusses the interpretation of the estimated results and justifies their
relative magnitudes.
It can be easily recognized that the certification fee is the most influential factor. This
finding partially helps explain a very high dropout rate of certified members once the
local government ceases subsidy for the VietGAP fee. Although there were no available
statistics at either provincial or national level, during the survey, few VietGAP groups
renewed their license after the end of their subsidized period. The large gap in the
impacts between the certification fee and the price premium further emphasizes the
problem. Farmers usually have to pay for the fee at the beginning of the certification
process. Even the hypothetical profit gain from the premium can fully cover the initial
payment, it generally cannot compensate for the negative impacts of the former. Strict
budget constraint and heavily discounted future benefits of small farmers are possible
interpretations. Another reason might come from farmers’ skepticism about a guaranteed
premium which did not exist in reality.
In addition, there is potential to incorporate attributes related to organic fertilizer in
VietGAP scheme. While an extreme requirement of using only organic fertilizer is obvi-
ously not acceptable, harvest-based application combined with chemical fertilizers may
not deprive the participation. The latter even shows positive effects in some analyses. It
is understandable since many respondents had partly realized the damages of overusing
synthetic fertilizers by the time of the survey. Supplementation of organic fertilizer was
also widely recommended. VietGAP, with a principle goal of achieving sustainable agri-
culture, can provide a systematic motivation for the combined application of fertilizers.
Moreover, higher participation can be achieved through benefits related to group pur-
chase of organic fertilizer. Delayed payment tends to have more consistent positive effects
than free shipping. Due to significant improvement in road systems and fertilizer out-
lets, shipping fee might not constitute a significant part of the fertilizer price. However,
rescheduled payment is reasonably preferred by farmers with restricted budgets.
Finally, this section explores the reasons behind the heterogeneity in the estimation of
the AMCEs. Compared to the nonmembers, VietGAP members only differ significantly
in their preference for delayed payment for organic fertilizers. However, such a difference
could not be solely attributed to the membership itself. Because the VietGAP partici-
pation is self-selected by a household, there are various confounders of the membership
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status 16. For example, the negative interactions are possibly due to the better wealth
status of the members.
In contrast, the RCT treatments are completely randomized, so causal interpretation is
plausible. Findings from marketing studies could explain the unexpected negative in-
teractions between the RCT treatments and the hypothetical requirement of applying
organic fertilizers. Accordingly, although both information and subsidy treatments suc-
cessfully encouraged the trial purchase of organic fertilizer, their promotional effects on
choice of VietGAP scheme with mandatory application of organic fertilizer subject to un-
favorable conditions. In particular, a regular application of organic fertilizer in a 2-year
period of VietGAP is a strict requirement for farmers, and there is no certainty about its
efficiency. Promotions on a feature which consumers have an uncertain preference of can
hurt choice probability of a product (Simonson et al., 1994). Similarly, Darke and Chung
(2005) argued a negative perception of the product caused by price promotion when its
quality is not assured. Moreover, the procedure of the experiments might have probabi-
lized the negative interactions. Immediately after receiving the treatments and making
a decision on trial purchase, the respondents were asked to choose VietGAP plans with
the potential obligation of using organic fertilizer. This might unexpectedly provoke a
misunderstanding among the treated groups that the investigators strategically enforced
them to buy the organic fertilizer in the long-term. As a result, they avoided VietGAP
plans with organic fertilizer application required.
5.5 Conclusions
To conclude, this study investigates smallholder farmers’ preferences of a certification
program. A randomized conjoint experiment was conducted on 745 small-scale green tea
farmers in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. The experiment requires farmers to decide whether
to participate in hypothetical VietGAP programs for tea production. Attributes are
randomly assigned to each option (profile), consisting of certification fee, record keeping,
application of organic fertilizer, free shipping for organic fertilizer, and delayed payment
for organic fertilizer. Price premium of the certification scheme were randomly assigned
at the household level. The study shows three important findings. First, the certification
fee has a very strong negative impact on participation decision. Second, harvest-based
application of organic fertilizer does not reduce the participation probability. Third,
delayed payment for organic fertilizer can slightly enhance participation.
16 Using the current sample, I ran t-tests to examine differences in background characteristics between
the VietGAP members and the non-members. As with the results in Chapter 3, I found significant
differences in demographics, land holdings and asset holdings between the two groups.
Farmers’ Preferences of Certification Schemes: A Randomized Conjoint Analysis 60
The findings of this study could give policy-makers and certification entities insightful
implications for the design of certification schemes for groups of small-scale farmers in
general.
From the second and the third findings, certification entities could possibly include sup-
plementation of organic fertilizer in the scheme with payment benefits for the members.
Combined application of organic and synthetic fertilizer, a sustainable farming practice,
can be incorporated into the protocol for certified production. As it is required in well-
known international standards, such as GlobalGAP, fertilizer application must be based
on soil conditions and in consultation with experts. Therefore, certification bodies may
collaborate with agricultural experts to prescribe a proper mixture ratio of organic and
non-organic fertilizers based on local soil conditions, before requiring compliance from
the farmers. At the same time, delayed payment for group purchase of organic fertilizers
can be introduced by certification parties. Agreements on input purchase with input
suppliers are one of the plausible services offered farmer groups (Poulton et al., 2010).
Such collective purchase of agricultural inputs was emerging in the study sites, where
government bodies acted as a facilitator for the connection between farmer groups and in-
put providers. Certification parties also have the capacity to substitute the governments’
role in such multilateral agreements.
However, based on the first findings, policies dealing with certification fee are crucially
important. The large initial fee could heavily prevent small farmers from joining the
certification programs which, although, might improve selling prices and farm income
later. Low demand caused by large initial costs is also seen for other agricultural ser-
vices such as crop insurance (Casaburi and Willis, 2018). To reduce the cost burden, a
prevalent approach is subsidization from governments or NGOs. Nonetheless, this could
make a sustainability certification program itself become unsustainable and distort the
production of certified commodities. Other sustainable solutions to the problem caused
by the certification fee are highly necessary. Agreements on sharing of certification fee
with wholesale buyers or a combination of public and private financing of certification
are also promising alternatives (OECD, 2018). In addition, based on the findings of a
positive impact of delayed payment for the purchase of organic fertilizer, the same im-
plication could be applied for the certification fee. For instance, rescheduled payment
of certification fee, such as monthly or annual installment payment, could reduce the
financial burden effectively for the participants.
One major shortcoming of this study is about the validity of farmers’ stated preference.
There are a range of causes for the biased choice in the survey, such as hypothetical bias,
social desirability bias and other cognitive bias (Krosnick and Judd, 2014; Schwarz, 1999).
As such, their stated preference in the survey might differ from the revealed preference
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when they make the actual choice in reality. However, the recent work of Hainmueller
et al. (2015) demonstrated that conjoint analyses have the possibility to reflect real-world
behavior. This study also followed their recommendation in using paired conjoint design
to maintain the credibility of the stated choice. The study sites – 9 communes in Dai
Tu district – also have the favorable conditions for the conjoint experiment due to the
high familiarity of farmers with VietGAP program. Therefore, reliability of the stated
preference could not be a severe issue of the experimental results.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary of findings
This dissertation makes original contributions to a central research question: How do
small-scale farmers benefit from collective action?. The dissertation shows three research
gaps, corresponding to three research questions, in the two strands of literature on col-
lective action among small-scale farmers. Those research gaps are addressed with three
case studies on small-scale green tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam.
In detail, the dissertation contributes to knowledge of how collective action affects income
of small-scale farmers – the first large strand of literature on collective action. Chapter 3
evaluates the economic impacts of collective marketing through farmer cooperatives on
income of smallholder tea farmers. Although tea is a highly important product for small
farmers in many developing countries, we know little about the impacts of collective
marketing on tea farmers. Chapter 3 therefore contributes to knowledge on collective
marketing by analyzing a sub-sample of 329 farmers from a total sample of 476 small-
holder tea farmers in Thai Nguyen. Sample data comes from a household survey in 2017
which uses mixed strategies. All member of cooperatives and certification groups are
included if possible, while non-members are sampled randomly. The treatment is defined
as membership in non-certified cooperatives, implying that collective marketing is the
principal collective action among cooperative members. PSM is employed to mitigate
bias caused by the self-selection of the cooperative membership. However, across different
PSM models, this case study cannot find conclusive impacts of cooperative membership
on the income from tea farming. A plausible and important reason is that collective
marketing is inactive for many cooperative members. Another interpretation is the high
divergence in other components of cooperative membership, such as past certification
and technical assistance.
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By contrast, chapter 4 shows significant economic impacts of group certification on small-
holder tea farmers in Thai Nguyen. Thai Nguyen green tea products are principally
consumed in the domestic markets – a compelling context examined by very few studies
on certification standards. Thus, the case study makes an important contribution to
the literature on the impacts of certification programs for groups of smallholder farmers.
In this chapter, from the same sample of 476 small tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, this
study selects a different sub-sample of 401 farmers and continue to apply the same PSM
procedure as in chapter 3. Results show that adoption of group certification significantly
increases sales, selling price and net income. Labor costs are also higher for certified tea
farmers.
Lastly, Chapter 5 contributes to the second strand of literature in factors influencing
farmer participation in collective action. The case study is based on an RCA on 750
small-scale tea farmers in Thai Nguyen. The methods allow estimating causal effects
of design attributes on farmer participation in hypothetical certification programs (Vi-
etGAP). Despite their importance, very few studies examine how design attributes of
certification schemes affect farmer participation. Results indicate that the requirement
of combined application of organic and chemical fertilizer, a recommended practices for
maintaining soil health, does not lead to a significant reduction in participation. In
addition, when this requirement is packaged with delayed payment for organic fertil-
izer purchase, participation rate can be enhanced. Importantly, despite the availability
of price premium, the certification fee is a major barrier preventing tea farmers from
produced certified food products
6.2 Further discussion
In addition to the discussions the three core chapters, by combining their findings, I
discuss further implications for central research question as well as for policies related to
collective action among small-scale farmers.
First, from finding of chapter 3 and chapter 4, the economic benefits that small-scale
farmers receive from collective action appear ambivalent. Collective action, by definition,
covers various activities, and those activities could differ greatly across farmer coopera-
tives. Moreover, membership in farmer cooperatives does not mean active participation
in collective activities. Consequently, when studies evaluate impacts of the cooperative
membership – a bundle of different components with different active status, results could
be highly diverged. It is also difficult to attribute impacts to any single collective activ-
ities, or services, offered by the farmer organizations. Thus, it is recommended to look
at farmer organizations focusing on specific one or one set collective activities, as the
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study in Chapter 4, to have evident results and policy implications 1. Similar calls for
separating impacts of individual interventions could also be seen in other studies (e.g.,
Oya et al., 2018) Further, in addition to impacts of the membership per se, impacts of
active participation worth further analyses (Fischer and Qaim, 2012).
Second, member contribution is a major issue for the realization of benefits from collective
action among smallholder farmers. Based on the findings of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5,
even when group acquirement of certification is beneficial to small-scale farmers, certifi-
cation costs may heavily constrain farmers’ participation. There is considerable evidence
of positive economic impacts of voluntary certification standards on small-scale farmers,
as shown in Chapter 4. However, Chapter 5 reveals that loss in participation rate caused
by costs can far surpasses gain resulted from a higher price premium. There are also
studies reporting that production of certified food can hardly be maintained without
substantial support for costs (e.g. Kersting and Wollni, 2012). The same problem can be
applied for other collective activities which require large initial costs such as collective
processing and storage. It is common that low member’ activity deteriorates collective
marketing as somewhat reflected in Chapter 3 and in other case studies (Latynskiy and
Berger, 2016; Fischer and Qaim, 2014). Thus, one critical challenge for development
agencies as well as leaders of farmer organizations lies in encouraging small-scale farmers
to pool their resources together.
6.3 Limitations and future research
The findings in this dissertation are subject to two major limitations. The first limi-
tation is in the impact evaluation conducted in Chapter 3 and 4. The PSM procedure
might not have thoroughly addressed bias caused by the self-selection of membership
in marketing cooperatives and certification groups. The unconfoundedness assumption
– the key assumption of PSM – might not be fully satisfied in observational studies. I
therefore have made several attempts to assure the reliability of the findings, including a
careful balance checking of the covariates and consistency checking of the ATETs across
different models. However, to have precise causal inference, future studies should employ
methods with less risk of bias such as difference-in-differences or instrumental variables.
Such studies are scarce in the current literature (Rijsbergen et al., 2016; Roy and Thorat,
2008). RCT is undoubtedly the best method to see the causal impacts, yet there have
been no RCT studies on either collective marketing or certification groups.
1 However, it is noted that the results of chapter 3 and chapter 4 are not directly comparable because
different control observations were used to estimate the ATETs in the PSM procedure. Besides, the
insignificant ATETs in chapter 3 does not mean that marketing cooperatives have no effects on farm
income. Therefore, the findings from the two chapters do not imply that certification programs are
effective in improving small-scale farm income while marketing cooperatives are not.
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In addition to the method of impact evaluation, outcome variables examined Chapter
3 and Chapter 4 are only related income from tea farming in a one-shot survey. Par-
ticipation in marketing cooperatives or certification groups typically leads to farmers’
specialization in producing one agricultural product. Despite an increase in income from
specialized products, income from other livelihoods could be negatively affected, result-
ing in ambivalent impacts on total household income (Vellema et al., 2015). Further, the
economic impacts of farmer organizations are likely to depend on their operation period.
The cross-sectional data in this dissertation does not offer rich enough information to
heterogeneous impacts based on the age of the marketing cooperatives or certification
groups. Hence, comprehensive future studies which examine broader and longer-term
outcomes are necessary.
The second major limitation is about the external validity of the results. The findings
from three case studies in this dissertation could be limited to the population of small-
scale green tea farmers in Thai Nguyen, Vietnam. Extrapolation of the findings should
cautiously consider differences in crop production and characteristics of the small-scale
farmers. For example, there are various differences in tea production between the North
and the South of Vietnam. Small farmers in the northern region often specialize in
producing green tea and follow traditional farming and processing methods. Meanwhile,
farmers in the southern region also produce black tea, and they are seemingly more open
to the application of new farming methods. Thus, one should take those characteristics
in consideration when applying findings of this study to the southern region of Vietnam.
Besides, small-scale tea producers in this study mostly supply to domestic markets.
Benefits from and participation in collective action could be dissimilar in context with
strong links to international markets. Effects of contextual factors on the impacts of
collective action are primarily scrutinized in qualitative studies (Oya et al., 2018). It is
interesting to have quantitative studies that compare the impacts of a collective activity
across food products or regions with distinct characteristics.
Appendix A
An appendix for chapter 3 and 4
Variables Description
Potential covariates
City dummy 1 if the household is in Tan Cuong commune; otherwise 0
Market distance Distance from household to the nearest village market (km)
Family size Total number of household members
Labor size Total number of household members who age from 15 to 65
Female-headed dummy 1 is the household is female-headed; otherwise 0
Age of the household head Age of the household head 
Education of the household head Years of education of the household head (years)
Kinh ethnic head dummy 1 if the household head is Kinh ethnic, which is a major ethnic group; otherwise 0
Village leader dummy 1 if the household head has a position in local governing bodies; otherwise 0
Credit dummy 1 if the household took out a loan from local banks within the last 5 years; otherwise 0
Total agricultural land holding Includes cropland holding and forest land holding (ha)
Cropland holding Total area of land available for crop cultivation owned by the household (ha)
Motorbike ratio The number of owned motorbike divided by family size
Computer dummy 1 if the household possesses a computer or laptop; otherwise 0
Car dummy 1 if the household possesses a car or truck; otherwise 0
Number of roasting machines Total number of tea roasting machines owned by the household 
Outcome variables
Sales value Total revenue from selling tea products in the last 12 months (Million VND)
Fresh production Physical amount of fresh tea production during the last 12 months (Ton)
Tea farm size Area of cultivated tea farm (ha)
Productivity Fresh production divided by tea farm size (Ton/ha)
Average price Sales value divided by fresh production (Million VND/Ton)
Input costs Costs of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and plantlets  in the last 12 months (Million VND)
Labor costs Costs of hired labor  in the last 12 months (Million VND)
Net income Sales value deducted by input costs and labor costs (Million VND)
Table A.1: Description of covariates and outcome variables
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Sales value Fresh production Tea farm size Productivity
Average price Input costs Labor costs Net income
Figure A.1: Box graphs of the outcome variables
Certified non-coop 
members Control group Difference
(n = 87) (n=254)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.E.
Potential covariates
City dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.39 0.49 0.58 0.49 -0.19*** 0.06
Market distance (km) 2.87 1.36 1.98 1.23 0.89*** 0.16
Family size 4.31 1.26 4.00 1.27 0.31** 0.16
Labor size 3.14 1.02 2.85 0.96 0.29** 0.12
Female-headed dummy (1=yes, 0 =no) 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 -0.01 0.05
Age of the household head 48.37 9.79 48.32 11.84 0.04 1.41
Education of the household head (years) 7.66 2.35 7.12 2.55 0.53* 0.31
Kinh ethnic head dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.94 0.23 0.94 0.24 0.01 0.03
Village leader dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.17 0.38 0.09 0.29 0.08** 0.04
Credit dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.66 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.16** 0.06
Total agricultural land holding (ha) 0.95 0.69 7.41 7.50 0.21** 0.09
Cropland holding 0.58 0.29 4.07 2.20 0.17*** 0.03
Motorbike ratio 0.53 0.23 0.52 0.25 0.01 0.03
Computer dummy (1=yes, 0=no) 0.38 0.49 0.20 0.40 0.18*** 0.05
Car dummy (1=yes, 0= no) 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.03
Number of roasting machines 1.74 0.62 1.24 0.73 0.50*** 0.09
Outcome variable
Sales value (Mil. VND) 173.04 129.42 91.09 72.52 81.96*** 11.23
Fresh production (Ton) 4.34 2.33 2.59 1.73 1.76*** 0.24
Tea farm size (ha) 0.48 0.26 0.29 0.18 0.19*** 0.03
Productivity  (Ton/ ha) 9.86 4.47 9.41 4.55 0.45 0.56
Average price (Mil. VND/ Ton) 38.37 13.03 35.00 12.98 3.37** 1.61
Input costs (Mil. VND) 22.82 12.88 15.74 10.03 7.08*** 1.34
Labor costs (Mil. VND) 14.33 16.55 4.84 7.41 9.49*** 1.31
Net income (Mil. VND) 135.90 113.95 70.51 64.14 65.38*** 9.91
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Table A.2: Mean differences: Certified non-coop members vs. Control farmers
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Certified coop 
members Control group Difference
(n = 60) (n=254)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.E.
Potential covariates
City dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.87 0.34 0.58 0.49 0.28*** 0.07
Market distance (km) 1.31 1.04 1.98 1.23 -0.67*** 0.17
Family size 4.23 1.36 4.00 1.27 0.24 0.18
Labor size 3.05 1.08 2.85 0.96 0.20 0.14
Female-headed dummy (1=yes, 0 =no) 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.03 0.06
Age of the household head 50.25 9.93 48.32 11.84 1.93 1.65
Education of the household head (years) 7.78 2.44 7.12 2.55 0.66* 0.36
Kinh ethnic head dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.93 0.25 0.94 0.24 0.00 0.04
Village leader dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.15 0.36 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.04
Credit dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.50 -0.06 0.07
Total agricultural land holding (ha) 0.80 0.77 7.41 7.50 0.05 0.11
Cropland holding (ha) 0.48 0.23 4.07 2.20 0.07*** 0.03
Motorbike ratio 0.64 0.30 0.52 0.25 0.12*** 0.04
Computer dummy (1=yes/ 0=no) 0.45 0.50 0.20 0.40 0.25*** 0.06
Car dummy (1=yes/ 0= no) 0.12 0.32 0.04 0.19 0.08** 0.03
Number of roasting machines 1.47 0.83 1.24 0.73 0.23** 0.11
Outcome variable
Sales value (Mil. VND) 158.90 168.22 91.09 72.52 67.81*** 14.08
Fresh production (Ton) 2.99 1.83 2.59 1.73 0.41 0.25
Tea farm size (ha) 0.33 0.22 0.29 0.18 0.03 0.03
Productivity  (Ton/ ha) 9.90 4.30 9.41 4.55 0.49 0.65
Average price (Mil.VND/ Ton) 48.20 19.87 35.00 12.98 13.20*** 2.09
Input costs (Mil. VND) 17.23 14.01 15.74 10.03 1.50 1.56
Labor costs (Mil. VND) 13.34 20.83 4.84 7.41 8.51*** 1.62
Net income (Mil. VND) 128.32 148.35 70.51 64.14 57.81*** 12.43
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Table A.3: Mean differences: Certified coop members vs. Control farmers
Before 
matching After matching
(n = 314) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E
City dummy 0.28*** 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.09
Market distance 0.67*** 0.17 -0.06 0.21 -0.24 0.22 -0.16 0.23 -0.07 0.22 0.09 0.20 0.00 0.22 -0.09 0.22
Family size 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.31 0.29 0.16 0.28 0.36 0.25 0.49 0.32 0.19 0.30
Labor size 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.19 -0.04 0.20 0.13 0.23 -0.05 0.19 0.00 0.22 0.32 0.20 0.09 0.23
Female-headed dummy 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.08
Age of the household head 1.93 1.65 1.24 2.17 0.58 2.38 -0.75 2.69 0.13 2.29 0.64 1.97 -1.62 2.45 -1.28 2.50
Education of the household head 0.66* 0.36 -0.02 0.60 -0.26 0.56 -0.06 0.63 0.38 0.57 -0.25 0.56 0.55 0.62 -0.02 0.53
Kinh ethnic head dummy 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06
Village leader dummy 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.08
Credit dummy -0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.11 -0.06 0.10 -0.02 0.11 0.00 0.11 -0.11 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.11 0.11
Total agricultural land holding 0.05 0.11 -0.10 0.15 -0.17 0.16 -0.17 0.18 -0.01 0.15 0.02 0.17 -0.05 0.15 -0.13 0.18
Cropland holding 0.07** 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.00 6.00 -0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.05
Motorbike ratio 0.12*** 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05
Computer dummy 0.25*** 0.06 -0.07 0.08 -0.09 0.09 -0.06 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08
Car dummy 0.08** 0.03 -0.06 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06
Number of roasting machines 0.23*** 0.11 -0.06 0.17 -0.08 0.16 0.00 0.15 -0.04 0.18 0.09 0.15 -0.11 0.18 0.02 0.17
54 matches 54 matches 52 matches 55 matches 56 matches 53 matches 53 matches
In each model, boldface numbers indicate corresponding covariates are included in the Probit model. 
A caliper of 0.01 is applied for one nearest neighbor matching based on propensity score.
Model 4 to 7 restrict control farmers to communes where the treatment is available.
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Table A.4: Balance checking: Certified coop members vs. Control farmers
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Certified non-
coop members
Certified coop 
members Difference
(n = 87) (n = 60)
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.E.
Potential covariates
City dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.39 0.49 0.87 0.34 -0.48*** 0.07
Market distance (km) 2.87 1.36 1.31 1.04 1.56*** 0.21
Family size 4.31 1.26 4.23 1.36 0.08 0.22
Labor size 3.14 1.02 3.05 1.08 0.09 0.18
Female-headed dummy (1=yes, 0 =no) 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.02 0.06
Age of the household head 48.37 9.79 50.25 9.93 -1.88 1.65
Education of the household head (years) 7.66 2.35 7.78 2.44 -0.13 0.40
Kinh ethnic head dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.94 0.23 0.93 0.25 0.01 0.04
Village leader dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.17 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.02 0.06
Credit dummy (1=yes, 0 = no) 0.66 0.48 0.43 0.50 0.22 0.08
Total agricultural land holding (ha) 0.95 0.69 0.80 0.77 0.16 0.12
Cropland holding (ha) 0.58 0.29 0.48 0.23 0.10** 0.04
Motorbike ratio 0.53 0.23 0.64 0.30 -0.11** 0.04
Computer dummy (1=yes/ 0=no) 0.38 0.49 0.45 0.50 -0.07 0.08
Car dummy (1=yes/ 0= no) 0.06 0.23 0.12 0.32 -0.06 0.05
Number of roasting machines 1.74 0.62 1.47 0.83 0.27** 0.12
* 10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level 
Table A.5: Mean differences: Certified non-coop members vs. Certified coop members
Certified farmers vs. control farmers
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ATET S.E. ATET S.E. ATET S.E.
Sales value (Mil. VND) 48.81*** 15.38 44.06*** 14.33 38.33*** 14.31
Fresh production (Ton) 0.47* 0.25 0.35* 0.21 0.31 0.21
Tea farm size (Ha) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Productivity (Ton/Ha) 0.54 0.54 0.63 0.53 0.51 0.53
Average price (Mil.VND/ Ton) 6.41*** 2.23 6.37*** 2.24 5.10*** 2.21
Input expenditure (Mil. VND) 0.03 1.52 -0.51 1.38 0.84 1.40
Labor expenditure (Mil. VND) 5.85*** 1.82 5.37*** 1.73 4.85*** 1.75
Net income (Mil. VND) 42.93*** 13.65 39.20*** 12.94 34.33*** 12.92
n = 227 (82 treated and 145 control after coasened matching) 
The three models are different in control variables in the regression after coarsened exact matching 
Table A.6: ATET results with CEM
Appendix B
An appendix for chapter 5
1
Coef. S.E
Certification fee
VND 1 Mil -0.07*** 0.02
VND 2 Mil -0.13*** 0.02
VND 4 Mil -0.19*** 0.02
VND 8 Mil -0.26*** 0.02
Record keeping
No 0.01 0.01
Application of organic fertilizer
Harvest-based (chemical combinable) 0.02 0.01
Only organic fertilizer -0.14*** 0.02
Free shipping for organic fertilizer
Yes 0.01 0.01
Delayed payment for organic fertilizer
30 days 0.04*** 0.01
60 days 0.03** 0.01
Constant 0.71 0.02
n 7418
*10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level
Standard errors are clustered at household level
Table B.1: Regression coefficients of AMCEs for external choice
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VND 0
VND 1 Mil
VND 2 Mil
VND 4 Mil
VND 8 Mil
Mandatory
No
Not mandatory
Harvest-based (chemical combinable)
Only organic fertilizer
No
Yes
No
30 days
60 days
 Certification fee
 Record keeping
 Organic fertilizer application
 Free shipping for organic fertilizer
 Delayed payment for organic fertilizer
-.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2
Figure B.1: AMCEs for internal choice
Not mandatory # No
Not mandatory # 30 days
Not mandatory # 60 days
Harvest-based (chemical combinable) # No
Harvest-based (chemical combinable) # 30 days
Harvest-based (chemical combinable) # 60 days
Only organic fertilizer # No
Only organic fertilizer # 30 days
Only organic fertilizer # 60 days
-.2 -.1 0 .1
Figure B.2: Interaction between application of organic fertilizer and delayed payment
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1
Coef. S.E.
VietGAP dummy
yes 0.23*** 0.04
Certification fee
VND 1 Mil -0.06*** 0.02
VND 2 Mil -0.14*** 0.02
VND 4 Mil -0.21*** 0.03
VND 8 Mil -0.28*** 0.03
Certification fee # VietGAP dummy
VND 1 Mil#yes -0.02 0.03
VND 2 Mil#yes 0.02 0.04
VND 4 Mil#yes 0.05 0.04
VND 8 Mil#yes 0.03 0.04
Record keeping
No 0.01 0.01
Record keeping # VietGAP dummy
No#yes 0.00 0.02
Application of organic fertilizer 
Harvest-based (chemical combinable) 0.02 0.02
Only organic fertilizer -0.12*** 0.02
Application of organic fertilizer # VietGAP dummy 
Harvest-based (chemical combinable)#yes 0.00 0.03
Only organic fertilizer#yes -0.04 0.03
Free shipping 
Yes 0.01 0.01
Free shipping # VietGAP dummy 
Yes#yes 0.00 0.02
Delayed payment 
30 days 0.06*** 0.02
60 days 0.05*** 0.02
Delayed payment # VietGAP dummy
30 days#yes -0.06** 0.03
60 days#yes -0.05* 0.03
Constant 0.62 0.03
n 7418
*10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level
Standard errors are clustered at household level
Table B.2: Heterogenous effects by VietGAP membership
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*10% significant level, ** 5% significant level, *** 1% significant level
Standard errors are clustered at household level
Coef. S.E.
RCT treatment
Information 0.04 0.05
Subsidy 0.05 0.05
Application of organic fertilizer
Harvest-based (chemical combinable) 0.07*** 0.02
Only organic fertilizer -0.08*** 0.03
Application of organic fertilizer # RCT treatments
Information#Harvest-based (chemical combinable) -0.09 0.04
Information#Only organic fertilizer -0.05 0.04
Subsidy#Harvest-based (chemical combinable) -0.06* 0.03
Subsidy#Only organic fertilizer -0.11*** 0.04
Free shipping 
Yes 0.00 0.02
Free shipping # RCT treatments
Information#Yes 0.04 0.03
Subsidy#Yes 0.01 0.03
Delayed payment
30 days 0.06** 0.02
60 days 0.07*** 0.02
Delayed payment # RCT treatments
Information#30 days -0.03 0.03
Information#60 days -0.03 0.03
Subsidy#30 days -0.04 0.03
Subsidy#60 days -0.07* 0.04
Constant 0.55 0.03
n 7418
Table B.3: Heterogenous effects by RCT treatments
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